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INTRODUCTION 
No inquiry is more central to constitutional jurisprudence than the 
effort to delineate the duties of government. The courts' approach to 
this complex subject has been dominated by reliance on a simple dis-
tinction between affirmative and negative responsibilities. Govern-
ment is held solely to what courts characterize as a negative 
obligation: to refrain from acts that deprive citizens of protected 
rights. Obligations that courts conceive to be affirmative - duties to 
act, to provide, or to protect - are not enforceable constitutional 
rights. 1 
This austere conception of the role of government is not new; it has 
a lengthy pedigree.2 Recently, the Supreme Court has demonstrated 
its continuing loyalty to the conception, in contexts which vividly il-
lustrate its flesh and blood consequences. In DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services, 3 the Court left remediless the 
mother of a boy who had been beaten so severely he will require insti-
tutionalization for the rest of his life, despite an avoidable governmen-
tal failure to prevent the harm. In Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services, 4 the Court upheld restrictions which will make abortions dif-
ficult or impossible for poor women to obtain. In both contexts the 
Court refused to hold that a governmental duty had been breached, on 
the ground that the Constitution does not impose affirmative obliga-
1. Professor Martha Minow has insightfully described the parallel between the Court's own 
refusal to protect and that which it condones on the part of government. See Martha Minow, 
Law and Violence (unpublished speech presented at the Harvard Medical School Continuing 
Education 5th Annual Conference on Abuse and Victimization in Life.Span Perspective, Mar. 
24, 1989) (transcript on file at the Harvard Law School Library). 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 199-246. 
3. 109 s. Ct. 998 (1989). 
4. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
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tions on government. s 
In these and other cases, the powerful talismanic quality of certain 
phrases is striking. The due process clause grants no affirmative 
rights. 6 Governmental inaction is not actionable. 7 The Constitution is 
a charter of negative liberties. 8 These phrases signal the end of discus-
sion about constitutional protections. A conclusion has been reached 
and no further reasoning is necessary. Yet when a conclusory incanta-
tion permits so many harms to flourish unchecked by the Constitution, 
it should send the opposite signal: that the language, and the concepts 
it describes, must be scrutinized with care. This article undertakes 
that scrutiny. 
Part I describes the current approach, which demands adherence 
to the notion of a negative constitution. Part II critiques the assump-
tions underlying the current approach and demonstrates its undesir-
able consequences in decisional law. Part III explores the tenacious 
barriers to recognition of affirmative governmental duties: the consti-
tutional, philosophical, and common law roots of the notion of a nega-
tive constitution, as well as the belief that recognizing affirmative 
duties would be an invitation to chaos. Finally, Part IV proposes dis-
carding the rhetoric of negative rights and suggests an approach for 
constructing a theory better designed to effectuate constitutional goals. 
I. THE CHARTER OF NEGATIVE LIBERTIES: THE 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
Traditionally, the protections of the Constitution have been viewed 
largely as prohibitory constraints on the power of government, rather 
than affirmative duties with which government must comply.9 
Although scholars have long challenged this view, 10 the courts have 
steadfastly adhered to it. Once a claim on government is cast as a 
request that it engage in, rather than refrain from, a particular activ-
ity, its dismissal is ordained. This Part seeks simply to describe the 
prevailing conception of the Constitution as solely a charter of nega-
5. See DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003; Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3051. 
6. See, e.g., DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003; Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3051. 
7. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1208 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
8. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th 
Cir. 1987), affd., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). 
9. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive 
State, 132 U. PA. L. RE.v. 1293, 1295 (1984); Laurence Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conun-
drum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 330, 331 (1985); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. RE.v. 1363, 1392 (1984). 
10. See, e.g., articles cited infra note 20. 
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tive liberties; Part II will demonstrate the flaws in its central 
distinction. 
The conventional wisdom distinguishes between negative rights to 
be free from governmental interference and positive rights to have gov-
ernment do or provide various things. I I The conventional wisdom is 
that the Constitution recognizesI2 only the former. Individuals have 
no right to have government do anything at all; it must only refrain 
from harming or coercing them. 
This sweeping statement encompasses a broad spectrum of possible 
claims against the government. At one end of the spectrum are nar-
row claims that particular government officials violated specific duties 
to known individuals. In its pure form, the conventional wisdom dis-
claims such duties. For example, in Gilmore v. Buckley, IJ the First 
Circuit found no liability when state officials released a dangerous 
mental patient they knew had threatened a specific individual, without 
warning the individual, leading to her murder the next day. In Archie 
v. City of Racine, I4 the Seventh Circuit upheld dismissal of a claim 
against a 911 dispatcher who gave incorrect advice and erroneously 
failed to dispatch an ambulance for a caller who then died. 
According to the conventional wisdom, rejection of these claims 
follows from rejection of broader claims for government services. The 
conventional view holds that citizens have no constitutional right to 
government services. Government need not establish policeI5 or fire 
departments;I6 it need not provide medical17 or social services. From 
this premise follows another: that the greater includes the lesser. Is 
11. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1392. 
12. Or claims to recognize; such a simplistic distinction is of course impossible to implement 
perfectly. See infra text accompanying notes 24-29 and 50·55. 
13. 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). 
14. 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989). 
15. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 
(1984). 
16. Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 1984). 
17. Archie, 847 F.2d at 1222. 
18. The greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine views services as gratuitous privileges which gov-
ernment chooses to provide, and reasons that the greater power to withhold a benefit includes the 
lesser power to grant it with conditions. The doctrine was widely used in the nineteenth century. 
In its pristine form, the doctrine held that since the greater always includes the lesser, if a man 
has an absolute right to do a thing (e.g., stop dealing with his employer at will) he may qualify 
the exercise of that right by agreeing to relinquish it on condition. That this condition is, or even 
is intended to be, injurious to a third person is immaterial, for the court cannot inquire into the 
intention with which a lawful act is done. See G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN 
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 140 (1918) (citing Allen v. Flood, App. 
Cas. 1 (1898)). Current jurisprudence assumes that the greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine is 
limited by the constraints of the Constitution. Thus it is subservient to the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and may not be used to permit 
government to withhold services based on impermissible factors such as race, Yick Wo v. Hop-
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Because government has no duty to provide services, if it chooses to 
provide them, it need not do so competently.19 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago Department 
of Social Services, rejecting a due process claim20 against a social ser-
vice agency which negligently failed to protect a child from a brutal 
beating which inflicted irreversible injury, explains and reaffirms the 
conventional thinking about government duty to provide competent 
services: 
The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power 
to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. 
It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property 
without "due process oflaw," but its language cannot fairly be extended 
to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those in-
kins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But reconciling the greater-includes-the-lesser and unconstitutional 
conditions doctrines may not be so easy. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions. 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1458 (1989). See generally Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium, 26 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175-345 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 159-67. 
19. Much of the articulation of this view has occurred in the courts of appeals. Based on this 
reasoning, in Jackson v. City of Joliet the court refused to hold police liable when, in the course 
of observing a burning car, they made no attempt to determine whether it was occupied or to call 
an ambulance, and two people, one six-months pregnant, died in the car. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 
1983), ceri denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). In Jackson v. Byrne, police during a firefighters' strike 
barred firefighters from gaining access to a firehouse though a fire had broken out directly across 
the street. Two children died. The court refused to find governmental liability, reasoning that 
the Constitution creates no positive entitlement to fire protection. 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir. 
1984). In Bowen v. De Vito, mental health officials released a patient who had killed before, and 
was known to be dangerous, and he killed again. The court held that "there is no constitutional 
right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen." 686 F.2d 
616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). 
In particular, Judges Posner and Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit have been zealous sup-
porters of this view. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easter-
brook, J.; Posner, J., concurring); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (Posner, J.); 
Bowen, 686 F.2d at 616 (Posner, J.); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvon, 
Finden, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuen: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (arguing that imposing liability for failure to rescue would be economi-
cally inefficient). 
20. When the courts speak of the Constitution as a charter of negative rights, the discussion 
in defense of this proposition often proves to be solely concerned with due process. See, e.g., 
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983). Many scholars arguing that the 
Constitution contains affirmative rights have focused on the due process clause, often in conjunc-
tion with the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the 
Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 407 (1966) (arguing for a governmental duty of minimum pro-
tection); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Adjudica-
tion and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966) (same); Frank 
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969) (same). However, the arguments for posi-
tive rights are by no means confined to this approach. See Kreimer, supra note 9 (arguing that 
given pervasive government regulation, negative rights concept is inadequate); Arthur Selwyn 
Miller, Toward a Concept of Consti'tutional Duty, 1968 SUP. CT. REv. 199 (argument for positive 
rights from structure and purpose of Constitution as a whole); Laurence Tribe, Unraveling Na-
tional League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government 
Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977) (argument for affirmative rights from Usery decision); 
Tushnet, supra note 9 (agreeing that present balance of positive and negative rights is askew, but 
arguing that entire rights rhetoric should be abandoned). 
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terests do not come to harm through other means. Nor does history 
support such an expansive reading of the constitutional text .... [The 
purpose of the Clause] was to protect the people from the State, not to 
ensure that the State protected them from each other. The Framers were 
content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area 
to the democratic political process. 
Consistent with these principles, our cases have recognized that the 
Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmen-
tal aid . . . . If the Due Process Clause does not require the State to 
provide its citizens with particular protective services, it follows that the 
State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could have 
been averted had it chosen to provide them.21 
Finally, at the far end of the spectrum are broad claims that gov-
ernment must provide food to the starving, jobs to the unemployed. If 
courts are unwilling to recognize governmental duties toward specific 
endangered individuals, or duties by government agencies and employ-
ees to meet their job descriptions, then broadly worded claims for min-
imum subsistence seem doomed to failure. In their most utopian 
form, these claims are made only by scholars22 or by judges warning 
that they are the inevitable result of embarking on the slippery slope of 
requiring governmental duties.23 
If claims for minimum subsistence, or even increased police and 
fire protection, are the feared result, application of the conventional 
wisdom is thought to keep the courts off the slippery slope entirely. 
Like most legal constructs, however, the conventional wisdom rarely 
exists in its pure form. This is not to underestimate the power of the 
construct, which is considerable. Nevertheless, courts have often per-
mitted liability for what might be classified as governmental inaction. 
Some constitutional provisions clearly mandate affirmative govern-
mental conduct. For example, the sixth amendment requires govern-
ment to provide an accused a speedy public trial, compulsory process, 
assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to be informed of the nature 
of the accusation and confronted with the witnesses against him.24 
The equal protection clause requires that government sometimes take 
affirmative steps to ensure that certain groups are not treated un-
equally;25 and has been held to mandate government provision of 
21. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003-04 (1989). 
22. See, e.g., Bendich, supra note 20 (arguing for a governmental duty of minimum protec-
tion); Cox, supra note 20 (same); Michelman, supra note 20 (same). 
23. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Archie v. City 
of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989). See infra text accompany-
ing notes 309-27. 
24. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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goods and services which individuals would otherwise be denied be-
cause of their poverty.26 The conventional wisdom views these guar-
antees as aberrations; exceptions which prove the rule.27 It asserts 
that their language contrasts with the negative phrasing elsewhere in 
the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the sixth amendment's affirmative pro-
tections are made necessary by its peculiar context: the government's 
initial deprivation of liberty.28 Likewise, the equal protection clause 
simply says that once government has acted, either on behalf of a cer-
tain group, or to place a certain group at a disadvantage, it must en-
sure that its acts have not created an invidious inequality.29 
It is difficult to distill a rule from these cases independent of the 
requisites of particular constitutional provisions. It would not be a 
correct characterization to say that once government has acted, it 
must act competently, or fairly, or continue to act at all. The public 
services cases have flatly rejected this formulation. 30 It is more accu-
rate to describe the rule as saying that once government has acted to 
place a person in danger, it must protect him from that danger. Thus 
in White v. Rochford, 31 where police arrested the driver of a car and 
left the remaining passengers, two young children, in the car alone on 
a busy highway, the Seventh Circuit found liability. In situations 
where a plaintiff is in custody, or has been involuntarily committed, 
the courts more willingly find a duty to protect. 32 In cases in which 
the state is viewed as having done nothing to cause or worsen the 
plaintiff's situation, though it is aware of a danger to her which it 
could easily prevent, the courts are generally unwilling to find 
26. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to divorce); Douglas v.• 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (attorney for ,appeal of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 19 
(1956) (trial transcript). 
27. Of course, even rights which are phrased in the affirmative can be narrowly construed, 
and the Rehnquist Court's antipathy for governmental duties is evident even in regard to the 
rights whose affirmative nature is textually obvious. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 
2765 (1989) (no constitutional right to appointment of counsel for collateral appeals for indigent 
prisoner in capital cases); United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989) (sixth amendment 
not violated by government confiscation of accused's assets before trial though effect would be to 
prevent defendant from paying for an attorney); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 109 
S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (approving drug testing of railway workers after accidents); National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (fourth amendment not violated by drug 
testing of customs workers despite lack of individualized suspicion); Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 
1060 (1989) (federal court may not hear habeas petition presenting claim of a new constitutional 
right, except in rare instances when that right, if recognized, would be applied retroactively). 
28. David Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864, 873 
(1986). 
29. See id. at 880. 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 294-99. 
31. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
32. See, e.g., DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Es-
telle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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liability. 33 
Consistent with a burgeoning trend in tort law,34 courts, prior to 
the DeShaney decision, carved out an exception to the rule against 
affirmative duties when a special relationship was found to exist be-
tween the government and the injured party, such that government 
officials had undertaken to assist or protect particular individuals or 
classes. 35 However, the DeShaney holding seems to invalidate this ap-
proach, by holding that the only special relationship the Court recog-
nizes is that between a custodian and a person in custody, and that it 
arises solely from the government's act of placing the person in danger 
or otherwise restraining his liberty.36 
In short, the conventional wisdom rests on the efficacy of the dis-
tinction between government action and inaction. Government has no 
obligation to act, except, in limited circumstances, to ensure that no 
harm is caused by its previous actions. In order to make the distinc-
tion between action and inaction, it becomes crucial to determine what 
constitutes a governmental act, to distinguish the acts of government 
from those of private persons, and to delineate the circumstances in 
which the government has caused harm. Therefore, the distinction 
between action and inaction reappears in other forms: the public/pri-
vate distinction; the penalty/subsidy distinction; and the rules of cau-
sation. Part II examines the application of the action/inaction 
distinction in its various forms, and seeks to demonstrate that it is 
unworkable and misguided. 
II. THE CHARTER OF NEGATIVE LIBERTIES: THE FLAWED 
NATURE OF THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
The conventional wisdom about governmental duties reflects an 
unfaltering belief in the rightness of certain distinctions. Moreover, it 
33. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (no liability where 911 
dispatcher gave wrong advice to i11 caller and erroneously failed to dispatch an ambulance, and 
caller then died), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir.) 
(no liability where state knew of threat to specific individual yet released dangerous mental pa· 
tient who murdered her the next day), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Ellsworth v. City of 
Racine, 774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985) (no liability when police who were protecting a witness 
failed to do so adequately, resulting in attack); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 314 (1965). But see Doe v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(liability where foster parent's abuse of child permitted by state agency's failure to monitor home 
adequately); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 314-24; 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. 
GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 18.7 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. I 1990). 
35. See Note, Defining the Scope of the Due Process Right to Protection: The Fourth Circuit 
Considers Child Abuse and Good Faith Immunity, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 940, 948-64 (1985), 
36. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06. 
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displays great faith in the ability of language to capture those distinc-
tions. 37 Its method is to classify claims about governmental obliga-
tions according to a simple either-or system. Is the government being 
asked to act or to refrain from acting? To protect from the acts of 
private parties or from its own wrongful acts? To afford positive, af-
firmative rights or negative rights? If the former, relief is denied. 
In short, major issues about the scope of constitutional protection 
are resolved by reference to a series of highly rigid and conceptualistic 
distinctions38 which exalt negative over positive rights, and hold that, 
for government, only action is actionable. The purpose of this Part is 
to take a close look at these distinctions which the courts vest with 
such tremendous power. Section II.A argues that the distinction be-
tween action and inaction is far too arbitrary and simplistic to describe 
the complex web of acts and omissions through which government 
conducts its business. Sections II.B and II.C examines in detail two 
variations on the distinction between action and inaction: the public/ 
private distinction, with particular attention to its misuse in the 
DeShaney decision; and the penalty/subsidy distinction, in the context 
of the abortion funding cases, most recently Webster v. Reproductive 
Services. My goal is to demonstrate that the Court has relied on con-
clusory labels about negative and positive rights instead of articulat-
ing, in a principled fashion, the difficult value choices these cases 
require. 
A. The Disappearing Distinction Between Government 
Action and Inaction 
In the conventional wisdom, positive rights are rights to have gov-
ernment do or provide something. Negative rights are rights to have 
government refrain from doing something. In cases as diverse as 
DeShaney and Webster, the Court has labeled the plaintiff's complaint 
as a claim for positive rights, or government action, and dismissed it 
with little additional analysis. Are the spheres of positive and nega-
tive, inaction and action, so self-contained that this complacency is 
justified? 
The definitional difficulties in distinguishing action from inaction 
are manifold. It would be overstating the case slightly to say that the 
37. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 35-36 (1987). 
38. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from 
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 1014-18 (description of conceptualism as a belief 
that concepts at a high level of generality and abstractness correspond to elements of the real 
world and can form the basis for numerous and concrete subrules that can be deduced from 
them). 
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distinction is a useless one. It describes a common perception to say 
that a police officer who beats a suspect has acted, whereas a police 
officer who has decided not to interrupt his lunch break to aid an en-
dangered citizen has not acted. However, the description alone cannot 
be used to determine the scope of constitutional protections: that de-
termination requires a number of value choices. I argue in this section 
not that words like inaction and action should be stricken from the 
language, but that the distinction they describe is incapable of applica-
tion without value choices, and ultimately is incapable of serving the 
purposes for which it is employed. It cannot itself justify the choices 
about government responsibility which are made in its name. 
The term "act" is not self-defining. In fact, it is impossible to de-
fine without an understanding of the particular purpose for which the 
term is to be used. For example, an act could be defined, as it often is 
in common usage, as a voluntary physical movement, or a " 'willed 
muscular contraction.' " 39 Yet this definition is both atomistic and na-
ive. It is atomistic in that it defines conduct as an isolated event apart 
from its effects on others. It is naive because it is simplistic and rests 
on unimportant differences. As Professor George Fletcher observes: 
"Conscious non-motion is a greater assertion of personality than cas-
ual acting. One can only be puzzled by the widespread belief that the 
distinction between motion and non-motion is of importance to the 
law.''40 
Whether one has acted might be defined by state of mind, so that a 
conscious decision to pursue or not pursue a certain course of conduct 
would qualify. For example, an act could be defined as an "external 
manifestation of the will.''41 Using this definition, such consciously 
caused harm as a deliberate refusal to make an elevator available to 
people attempting to escape from a mine would be classified as an act, 
though it lacks a physical component.42 
What is apparent from attempts to focus on either physical or 
state-of-mind criteria is that it is difficult to consider the act apart 
from those whom it might affect, that is, apart from the harm it 
caused, was meant to cause, or was likely to cause. The law some-
times chooses to focus on the act apart from its consequences, as with 
39. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§ 6.4.1, at 421 (1978). 
40. Id. at 421-22. 
41. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 252 n.24 (1980). 
42. Id. 
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strict liability, 43 or attempt, 44 and more often ~hooses to focus on the 
act in relation to its consequences. 45 Which approach is chosen is a 
function of policy choices about duty, causation, fault, and remedy, 
not of the mechanical application of a definition of the term "act." 
The definition of an act is also dependent on the way its scope is 
delineated. That is, whether a defendant has "acted" in the eyes of the 
law depends largely on how far back in the chain of events the court is 
willing to look.46 In Prosser's well-known example of the difficulty of 
distinguishing action from inaction, "[f]ailure to blow a whistle or to 
shut off steam, although in itself inaction, is readily treated as negli-
gent operation of a train, which is affirmative misconduct."47 As this 
example illustrates, if a defendant has set a dangerous instrumentality 
in motion, the law must determine whether he should be liable for the 
consequences, though he has done nothing additional which could be 
classified as an immediate cause of harm. 48 
Perhaps it is common ground that the distinction between action 
and inaction is malleable. Even Judge Easterbrook, a zealous oppo-
nent of requiring affirmative duties, admits that "it is possible to re-
state most actions as corresponding inactions with the same effect, and 
to show that inaction may have the same effects as a forbidden ac-
tion."49 Especially in light of their fluidity, the question should be 
why these distinctions are important; what purpose they are meant to 
43. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFOR-
MATION OF TORT LAW 51-53 (1980) (arguing that strict liability is preferable to negligence the-
ory in tort law). 
44. G. FLETCHER, supra note 39, § 3.3.4. 
45. See id. at§ 6.4, at 420-46, § 8.2.1, at 588-93 (meaning of "act" in criminal law). 
46. Weinrib, supra note 41, at 253-55; see also infra text accompanying note 337 (same point 
in context of causation). 
47. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 56, at 
374 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). 
48. See, e.g., F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 34, § 18.6, at 719-22. 
49. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 
1338 (1989). A few lower court cases, including Archie itself, illustrate the correctness of his 
observation. In White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 382-83 (7th Cir. 1979), the majority found the 
police liable because they had abandoned children on the highway and deprived them of adult 
protection. The dissent objected that the police had done nothing to the children themselves: it 
was not the children but their uncle whom the police took into custody. The officers simply 
failed to take affirmative steps to protect them. 592 F.2d at 390 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting). In 
Archie, 847 F.2d at 1214-20, a 911 dispatcher gave an ill caller incorrect medical advice and 
failed to send an ambulance. The majority construed this as a mere failure to send rescue serv-
ices. The government did not "act" because it neither caused the illness nor interfered with the 
caller's ability to seek other medical help. The dissent argued that the defendant had affirma-
tively discouraged the caller from seeking other medical assistance. 847 F.2d at 1228-29 (Ripple, 
J., dissenting). In Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982), in which the department of 
mental health released a dangerous schizophrenic who then killed someone, the court construed 
the suit as a claim for state protective services, though the state's affirmative act of releasing the 
patient was obviously at issue. 
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serve. In the context of this discussion, the question is what the dis-
tinctions are asked to accomplish in the constitutional realm. 
In constitutional law, the relevant question is whether the govern-
ment has violated protected rights. The conventional wisdom holds 
that government cannot be held liable for its failure to act, but only for 
its affirmative acts, making it necessary to determine what constitutes 
an affirmative governmental a.ct. In the governmental context, draw-
ing a line between action and inaction is particularly problematic. 
First, the determination of governmental liability under the Con-
stitution must begin with its provisions, which rarely allow for a neat 
division between action and inaction. Even those constitutional duties 
which are most clearly phrased in the negative may be enforceable 
only through affirmative governmental exertions.50 The first amend-
ment exhorts only that "Congress shall make no law," but it has been 
obvious for some time that the mere failure to pass laws restricting 
speech will not relieve government of its responsibility for protecting 
the freedom of speech. Government may be required to take affirma-
tive steps and allocate resources to ensure public access to forums and 
information.51 It can be argued persuasively that the purpose of the 
fourth amendment was to keep government out of people's private af-
fairs, 52 but enforcement of the protections against unreasonable search 
and seizure depend on the government's observance of affirmative du-
ties to obtain warrants based on probable cause. The fifth amendment 
also speaks in terms of freedom from government coercion: "No per-
son ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself."53 Yet the Court correctly has recognized that to prevent this 
compulsion effectively, the government must take the affirmative step 
of warning the accused of their rights. 54 Although some members of 
the Rehnquist court disparage the Miranda warnings on the ground 
that they are not mandated by the fifth amendment, but are merely a 
way of enforcing it, 55 the elusiveness of this distinction is precisely the 
50. As discussed earlier, many constitutional duties are phrased in the affirmative, a state of 
affairs which the conventional wisdom explains as anomalous. See supra text accompanying 
notes 24-29. 
51. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (city must expend resources to clean up 
litter rather than deny leafletters access to a public forum); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 763-
64 (10th Cir. 1951) (police have duty to protect speakers from mob action). Tribe notes that 
Professor Zechariah Chafee first identified the need for affirmative government action to facilitate 
expression in 1941. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 12-25, at 998 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
52. See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 395-409 (1974). 
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
54. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
55. See, for example, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 
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point. Once it has been observed that some of the Bill of Rights is 
phrased in terms of positive commands56 and some in terms of nega-
tive exhortations, the task of interpreting the guarantees remains. The 
scope of the rights, and the means of enforcing them, must be 
ascertained. 
Second, the distinction between action and inaction fails to reflect 
the distribution of power and the ways in which government can cause 
harm in the modern welfare state. In the words of Professor Seth 
Kreimer: 
[T]he conception of negative rights as freedom from coercive violence 
has questionable value in shaping constitutional restraints on a govern-
ment that more often exerts its power by withholding benefits than by 
threatening bodily harm . . . . The greatest force of a modem govern-
ment lies in its power to regulate access to scarce resources. 57 
The assumption that government can deprive individuals of protected 
rights only by its actions does not take into account government's per-
vasive influence through regulatory action and inaction, 58 its displace-
ment of private remedies, and, indeed, its monopoly over some 
avenues of relief. 59 
Government can harm by its inertia. When an individual fails to 
act, perhaps he harms only himself. 60 Like a dangerous instrumental-
ity set in motion, when government fails to act, its momentum contin-
ues. It keeps collecting taxes; its employees continue to perform their 
jobs; its directives continue in force. In short, the bureaucracy contin-
ues to function. How it functions, whether it spends its money wisely, 
whether it promulgates rules, abides by them, or discards those which 
need to be discarded, whether it supervises its employees and disci-
(1984), and Justice O'Connor's opinion in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985). For a 
discussion of the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional common 
law, see Henry Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). But see Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Recon-
sidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978) (discussing dangers of 
assigning Miranda rules subconstitutional status). 
56. See, e.g., the sixth amendment protections, supra text accompanying note 24. 
57. Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1295-96. 
58. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1451. 
59. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (state monopoly over avenues for 
obtaining a divorce led to invalidation of requirement for payment of court fees); see also Sulli-
van, supra note 18, at 1451 (government has a monopoly on legitimate violence); Richard A. 
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions and Bargaining Breakdown, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 189, 
194-96, (1989) (government has monopoly over highways). 
60. Whether he causes harm will depend on the definition of harm, which is linked to the 
question of duty. For example, if under modern tort principles he has a duty to rescue under 
certain circumstances, he will harm those he fails to rescue when those circumstances obtain. 
See infra text accompanying notes 338-39. Under most circumstances, this will not be a large 
group of people in comparison to the size of the group vulnerable to harm from governmental 
wrongdoing. 
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plines them when necessary, all depend on a continuing series of 
choices. Whether these are choices in favor of action or inaction, they 
will have consequences, and in either case the consequences may cause 
harm.61 
Government can harm by its inaction and its inadequate action, as 
well as its direct action. Government can cause harm by failing to 
promulgate and enforce rules62 and failing to supervise. 63 It can harm 
by allocating scarce resources in an arbitrary or discriminatory fash-
ion. 64 It can harm by skewing incentives so that its employees find it 
more opportune to fail to protect or assist. 65 It can harm by displacing 
private services and failing to ensure adequate replacement services. 66 
In short, it can harm by its ostensible omissions, as seriously as, and 
often more efficiently than, by its direct, tangible actions. 67 
I referred earlier to the importance of determining the scope of an 
act: the question of how far back in the chain of events a court is 
willing to look. 68 The fact of pervasive and longstanding government 
influence makes this issue particularly complicated when the govern-
ment is the actor. If everything hinges on whether government acted 
to deprive an individual of rights, or simply failed to act by ignoring an 
existing deprivation, it becomes crucial to determine whether the dep-
rivation occurred before government acted. The action/inaction dis-
tinction does not work in part because it fails to provide a baseline, or 
vantage point, for comparison. If the question is whether government 
conduct has placed an individual in a worse position than she would 
have been in otherwise, that conduct must be measured against some 
standard. 69 The conventional assumption is that the baseline should 
61. The Court has held government inaction actionable in some circumstances, but has ex-
pressed hesitation in others. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985) (liability for failure to 
promulgate rules); City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989) (failure to supervise 
actionable only where motivated by deliberate indifference). 
62. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 
703, 713-14 (1974). 
63. City of canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). 
64. Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1295. 
65. As Professor Peter Schuck argues, in a bureaucracy incentives are automatically skewed 
in favor of inaction, since maintenance of the status quo is least likely to bring about visibility or 
personal risk. This natural skewing is greatly exacerbated by legal rules which not only do not 
penalize, but put a premium on, inaction. See PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 59-81 
(1983); see also Note, A Theory of Negligence for Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE L.J. 683, 688 
(1983). 
66. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94. 
67. Miller, supra note 20, at 209; Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1324-26. 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. 
69. Professor Kreimer suggests three baselines, which he calls history, equality and predic-
tion. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1359-74 and Seth F. Kreimer, Government "Largesse" and 
Constitutional Rights: Some Paths Through and Around the Swamp, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 229 
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be complete lack of government involvement. Although this choice of 
baseline is presented as "neutral and natural,"70 it is a choice which is 
difficult to defend. Indeed, the portrayal of government as passive and 
uninvolved is sharply at odds with the reality of government as perva-
sive regulator and architect of a vast web of social, economic, and 
political strategies and choices. 
Ultimately, mechanical use of the action/inaction distinction 
masks a failure to address the essential question of government's 
proper role under the Constitution. The distinction is merely a short-
hand: it cannot assist in making the value choices necessary to deter-
mine the scope of constitutional protections. Consider the proposition 
that government inaction is not actionable because it is not an abuse of 
power. This conclusory proposition begs the question of why inaction 
is not an abuse of power. If government can do harm to constitutional 
values through its inaction, insulating that inaction from judicial scru-
tiny has no apparent justification. The question of whether the harm 
should be actionable simply cannot be answered without giving con-
tent to the concept of abuse of power and determining whether that 
content is contiguous only with government's actions, or with its inac-
tions as well. 
B. The Public/Private Distinction 
The conventional wisdom holds that since the fourteenth amend-
ment limits only government and not private action, the state action 
requirement should not be circumvented by permitting liability for of-
ficial failure to prevent private activity.71 This limitation is phrased in 
the language of state action, but it is the familiar governmental action/ 
inaction distinction in slightly different linguistic clothing. The realm 
of state action is the realm in which the state has acted affirmatively; 
the private realm is that in which the state has failed to act to protect 
its citizens from harm by other forces. 
This is a highly conceptualistic application of the state action doc-
trine. It seeks to identify the sphere of government responsibility 
through a simple bright line: government is accountable only when it 
(1989). Although these baselines have been criticized, the insight that some baseline is needed 
has been widely accepted. See Louis Michael Seidman, Reflections on Context and the Constitu-
tion, 73 MINN. L. REv. 73, 78-80 (1988); Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1450 n.150 and Larry 
Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 175 (1989). 
70. Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 873, 887 (1987). 
71. Currie, supra note 28, at 866. 
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acts visibly and directly.72 It faithfully reflects the belief that the influ-
ences of the public and private spheres are neatly severable, and that 
the public sphere intrudes only by its tangible actions. 
The state action doctrine buttresses the action/inaction distinction, 
as Dean Paul Brest perceived: "In our everyday life we notice change 
and movement, while things that do not change fade into the back-
ground. It is consistent that we perceive the state as involved in our 
affairs when it assists in changing the status quo, and not when it as-
sists in maintaining it."73 
Political philosophers have often emphasized the importance of a 
critical vantage point from which to distinguish public and private, 
noting the relativism and dependence on historical and social circum-
stances of the public/private distinction. 74 As a practical matter, 
under current conditions of pervasive government regulation, the state 
may be involved in every sphere in some way, whether actively or 
through tacit approval. It may nevertheless be important to distin-
guish the public from the private realms for certain purposes, for exam-
ple to ensure that a sphere of individual privacy is protected. 75 But the 
decision to create these spheres has more to do with the substantive 
reach of constitutional protections than with "whether the govern-
ment has done anything to which the Constitution speaks. "76 Ulti-
mately, the question of the proper reach of governmental power must 
be faced on its own terms, and cannot be avoided through the fiction 
that the public/private distinction is a natural rather than a pragmatic 
construct. 
I will discuss the reach of the public/private distinction, its prem-
ises, and its practical consequences in the context of the Court's recent 
72. See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. 
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1329 (1982). 
73. Id. at 1322; see also Minow, supra note 37, at 22-25 ("neutral" action becomes non-
neutral when government fails to recognize pertinent differences). 
74. See, e.g., ANDREW LEVINE, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A CRITIQUE OF ITS THEORY 108 
(1981); John Dewey & James H. Tufts, ETHICS, Moral and Social Problems, ch. XVI, at 495, 
reprinted as abr. in SOCIAL AND PoLmCAL PHILOSOPHY 495 (J. Somerville & R. Santoni eds. 
1963). 
75. The state action doctrine and the public/private distinction it has engendered have been 
criticized on many levels. Scholars have questioned the coherence of the rules applying the state 
action doctrine, see, e.g., Charles Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: "State 
Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14. 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Robert 
Jerome Glennon & John Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State 
Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. Cr. REv. 221; the wisdom of the doctrine itself, see, e.g., Brest, 
supra note 72; Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985); and 
the philosophical basis for distinguishing public from private action, see ge11eral/y Symposium 011 
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). The focus here is on the ways in 
which the distinction flows from, or reinforces, a theory of negative rights. 
76. L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 18-7, at 1720; see also Brest, supra note 72, at 1330. 
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decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices. 77 The DeShaney case is worthy of close scrutiny because it is a 
classic example of the conventional, conceptualist approach and be-
cause it places the questions about the legitimacy of that approach in 
sharp relief. It looks to bright lines like state action, causation and 
custody to answer wrenching questions about government respon~ibil­
ity. The viability of that approach is considered in the following three 
sections. 
1. The Question of Responsibility 
Joshua DeShaney, the child of divorced parents, was placed in his 
father's custody by a Wyoming court in 1980, when he was one year 
old. His father, Randy DeShaney, then took him to live in Winnebago 
County, Wisconsin. When Joshua was three years old, county officials 
began receiving reports that his father was physically abusing him, and 
the Department of Social Services (DSS) began investigating these re-
ports. When Joshua was four, he was hospitalized with suspicious in-
juries, prompting the juvenile court to place him in temporary 
custody. The county soon remanded Joshua to his father's custody, 
with certain conditions. For the next fourteen months, the DSS 
caseworker assigned to Joshua's case received reports and made per-
sonal observations indicating that the abuse continued, and that the 
county's conditions had not been met, but took no action. In March 
1984, Joshua's father beat him so brutally that he suffered irreversible 
brain damage and will be institutionalized for the rest of his life. 78 
When told of this last beating, the caseworker said: "I just knew the 
phone would ring some day and Joshua would be dead."79 Joshua's 
mother sued on his behalf for damages to assist her in paying for his 
institutionalization. · 
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected the 
claim that the county deprived Joshua of liberty without due process 
of law. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the state was not implicated 
in the deprivation of Joshua's due process rights because "[the clause] 
forbids the State itself to deprive individuals oflife, liberty, or property 
without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be ex-
tended to impose an affirmative obliga~ion on the State to ensure that 
those interests do not come to harm through other means."8° For Jus-
tice Rehnquist, the facts in DeShaney fall into a simple pattern: there 
77. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). 
78. 109 S. Ct. at 1001-02. 
79. 109 S. Ct. at 1010 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 812 F.2d 298, 300 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
80. 109 S. Ct. at 1003. 
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are the things which Randy DeShaney did to his son, Joshua, and 
there are the things the state did not do to help Joshua. The state 
simply failed to protect Joshua from private violence. Since the state 
is not required to provide services, it need not provide them compe-
tently. Since it did not itself act violently, it is absolved of 
responsibility. 8 1 
This version of events ignores the complex interaction between the 
state and private entities. The state interviewed Randy DeShaney 
upon receiving the first complaint of abuse. It placed Joshua in tem-
porary custody after he was hospitalized. It convened a child protec-
tion team to consider Joshua's situation. It released Joshua to his 
father's custody, and placed conditions on that custody. It made regu-
lar visits to the home, and kept records of incidents observed on these 
visits and of the father's failure to meet the conditions. In short, the 
state made a series of conscious choices, and performed a series of 
affirmative acts. Throughout, the state also made a series of conscious 
decisions to take no action on its own findings and on reports from 
others.82 
One way to explain the Court's assertion that the state did not act 
is to classify this series of its affirmative acts as beside the point. The 
sole act that mattered was the ultimate beating of Joshua. Since the 
state did not participate directly in this beating, it bears no responsibil-
ity for its occurrence. 83 
To dispute this parsimonious view of governmental responsibility, 
one need not argue that the state should be responsible for its failures 
to act, or for the acts of others from which it fails to protect. One need 
only hold the state responsible for the foreseeable consequences of its 
actions.84 
Nevertheless, even the majority's version of the events leading up 
81. 109 S. Ct. at 1004. 
82. 109 S. Ct. at 1001-02; 109 S. Ct. at 1010-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Minow, 
supra note 1, at 8. 
83. If the state had placed Joshua in a foster home and then taken the same series of steps, 
the result might have been different. The Court specifically declined to address the issue. 109 S. 
Ct. at 1006 n.9. Since the decision, lower courts have reached varying results on the issue. See, 
e.g., Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (child in foster care is in state 
custody and has due process right to be free from unreasonable intrusions); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 
F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (same). But see Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989) (for 
qualified immunity purposes, it was not clearly established in 1984 that public officials who place 
foster child at risk of violence have violated due process); Milburn v. Anne Arundel County 
Dept. of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989) (when foster child had been voluntarily 
placed by parents, state's failure to protect him from abuse did not violate due process). For pre· 
DeShaney cases holding that foster care constitutes custody for due process purposes, see cases 
cited in DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002. 
84. The Court sidesteps this mainstream notion of responsibility by its use of a novel causa· 
tion theory which I will discuss shortly. See infra text accompanying notes 95-115. 
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to the final injuries illustrates the artificiality of the distinction between 
state and private action. The state acted by returning Joshua to his 
violent home, which it judged to be safe only if certain conditions were 
met, and by undertaking to ensure that those conditions were indeed 
met. 85 There was a symbiotic relationship between the hospital, which 
often was the first to learn of Joshua's injuries, and the state. The state 
placed Joshua in temporary custody at the hospital, gathered informa-
tion from its staff, and assumed the statutory responsibility to act on 
what it learned. 86 These facts belie the notion of a discrete series of 
private acts observed by a passive state. They instead describe an in-
tricate series of interlocking acts and omissions by the state, private 
agencies, and citizens. 87 
Moreover, the Court's version of events cannot be accepted at face 
value. As Justice Brennan argued, assumptions about the starting 
point, or baseline, may preordain the conclusion about whether the 
state acted to cause harm. 88 In one sense, the Court was willing to 
trace the chain of events only to the time when the state began its 
efforts to protect Joshua. These failed efforts were the only state "ac-
tions" the Court was willing to evaluate. 89 Yet for comparison pur-
poses, the Court was willing to start at a time before social services 
existed: it posited a situation in which the state, when faced with re-
ports of abuse, would provide no services at all, and concluded that 
Joshua was no worse off than he would have been at that time. 90 
The only starting point the Court did not assume was the descrip-
tively accurate one. The DeShaney court failed to place the state ac-
tions at issue in the greater context of pervasive social regulation. 
DSS, like other social welfare agencies, has consolidated and, in many 
respects, supplanted, the preexisting web of educational, law enforce-
ment and health institutions, relatives, friends and neighbors which 
used to attempt to assist abused children.91 Whether agencies like 
85. 109 S. Ct. at 1010-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Apparently, the subsequent failure to 
carry out this undertaking converted this series of acts into a mere failure to protect. 109 S. Ct. 
at 1006. 
86. 109 S. Ct. at 1001-02. 
87. Compare the liability of the auto driver who drives too quickly and then fails to brake. 
See infra text accompanying note 337. 
88. 109 S. Ct. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
89. 109 S. Ct. at 1004. Professor Ernest Weinrib called this device "pseudo-nonfeasance": 
distortion of misfeasance to nonfeasance by starting in the middle, or focusing on only one phase 
of an action. Weinrib, supra note 41, at 253-55. 
90. 109 S. Ct. at 1006. 
91. See Brief for Petitioners at 27, DeShaney v. Winnebago Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 
998 (1989) (No. 87-154); see also Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of 
the Least Drastic Alternative, 15 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1746-57 (1987); Daley, Treating Kin Like Foster 
Parents Is Straining a Child Agency, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1989, at A20, col. 5. 
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DSS have improved the situation is uncertain and perhaps irrelevant; 
the issue is that we cannot know what would have happened to Joshua 
before the state took over the business of child protection, and we can-
not pretend it did not do so. In the context of the pervasive regulation 
of child abuse which does exist, DSS clearly made a series of "calami-
tous"92 decisions which subjected someone dependent on its assistance 
to "private violence"93 which he otherwise would have been spared. 
At this point, the line between private and public violence, private and 
public responsibility, blurs.94 
2. Causation: The Requirement for Making Things Worse 
When assessing government responsibility, the issue of causation is 
closely intertwined with the state action inquiry. The question is 
whether the government acted in a way that caused harm or whether 
that harm was caused by private parties.95 The DeShaney court ab-
solved the state of Wisconsin of responsibility because, although it 
"stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a 
more active role," it did not make things worse.96 Judge Posner, the 
author of the lower court opinion, put the matter less delicately in 
Archie v. City of Racine: "[T]he victim [in Deshaney] ... would proba-
bly have been no better off if the negligent caseworker had never inter-
vened; he would simply have been beaten into a vegetative state by his 
father that much earlier."97 
Judge Easterbrook seemed to take the proposition a step further, 
arguing that even when a state puts a person in danger its responsibil-
ity is to protect him "to the extent of ameliorating the incremental 
risk."98 
The requirement for making things worse is rooted in early com-
92. 109 S. Ct. at 1007. 
93. 109 S. Ct. at 1004. 
94. As Martha Minow argues, the persistent failure of responsible social agencies and society 
in general to respond to such private violence implicates public patterns of conduct and morals. 
Minow, supra note 1, at 8. 
95. For further discussion of causation, see infra text accompanying notes 330-41; see also 
Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
24-29 (1982). The case of Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), illustrates the intersection 
between these inquiries. In that case, the parents of a murdered girl sued the parole board of a 
mental hospital for releasing her murderer, a mentally ill man of known dangerous propensities. 
The Court held that the decision to release the parolee was state action, but that his action in 
killing the girl five months later was not, because it was too remote a consequence of the parole 
officers' actions. 444 U.S. at 284-85. 
96. 109 S. Ct. at 1006-07. 
97. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1225 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring), 
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989). 
98. 847 F.2d at 1223. 
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mon law notions. Prosser notes that the rationale behind the common 
law refusal to recognize liability for nonfeasance is that "by 'misfea-
sance' the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, 
while by 'nonfeasance' he has at least made his situation no worse."99 
Once the defendant undertook to rescue someone, his only duty at 
common law was to avoid acts which would make matters worse. too 
Applying the requirement in the constitutional realm is problem-
atic for a number of reasons. First, it relies on an oversimplified and 
static version of the common law. Even the early common law found 
liability for failure to rescue under certain circumstances. tot In addi-
tion, the inexorable though slow trend in tort law has been to find 
ways of imposing liability for failure to rescue; 102 the no-duty rule may 
be "in the process of being consumed and supplanted by the widening 
ambit of the exceptions."103 
In addition, as the courts repeatedly note, tort principles are not 
always congruent with the scope of constitutional protection. 
Although the courts usually use this incongruence to grant lesser pro-
tections in constitutional cases, t 04 it may justify the granting of 
greater, or different protections, particularly when the defendant is not 
an individual but a governmental entity. tos The imbalance of power 
between individual and government, and the nature of government it-
self, may justify a different assessment of its responsibilities.106 
Two major problems arise from the requirement for making things 
99. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 56, at 373. 
100. Id. 
101. For example, in those failure to rescue cases in which the defendant had nonnegligently 
placed the plaintiff in peril and then failed to rescue, the early common law held the defendant 
strictly liable for the ensuing harm. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 53-54; James Barr Ames, Law 
and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 113 (1908). 
102. See, e.g., F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 34, § 18.6, at 720-24 (discussing 
enterprise liability, the duty on one who controls a dangerous instrumentality, the duty on volun-
teers to complete a rescue, and the growth of special relationships); see also Weinrib, supra note 
41, at 248 (discussing limitation of contributory negligence to cases where plaintiff was reckless, 
fading of voluntary assumption of risk rule, use of reasonable foreseeability doctrine, and in-
crease in number of special relationships). 
103. Weinrib, supra note 41, at 248. 
104. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. 
Ct. 1338 (1989); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 
U.S. 1049 (1984). 
105. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring), revd., 436 U.S. 
658 (1978); Christina Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. 
REv. 225 (1986); Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels & Davidson, Distinguishing a Custom 
or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 Iow A L. REv. 101, 120-27 (1986); Thomas A. 
Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IOWA L. REv. 443, 444 (1982). Tort law itself has 
an ambivalent attitude toward governmental defendants. See infra text accompanying notes 294-
99 (discussing public duty doctrine). 
106. See infra text accompanying notes 259-76. 
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worse. First, measurement is difficult. The question of whether the 
government has exacerbated the situation cannot be answered without 
both a baseline, or vantage point, for comparison, and a method of 
quantifying. The notion of "incremental harm" has no built-in time 
limits. For example, it might be logically extended to hold that the 
state need take no action to assist an abused foster child because he 
was also abused by his biological parents. If the question is whether 
Joshua DeShaney was made worse off by the government's conduct, 
the notion of "worse" is meaningless without determining "worse than 
things were at what point?" Worse than things would have been if 
DSS did not exist? If DSS always acted in a professional manner? If it 
had never released him to his father's custody? If the state of Wyo-
ming had never awarded his father custody? If he had been removed 
from custody before his father hit him the second time, or the last 
time? We also need some way of quantifying. Would Joshua 
DeShaney have been better off had DSS not existed? Would a relative 
have taken him in had she not been discouraged or prevented from 
doing so because of the pervasive social welfare structure which seeks 
to displace such self-help remedies? 
The Court routinely assumes, as it did in DeShaney, that the stan-
dard of comparison for government actions is whether they render the 
plaintiff worse off than she would have been at a time when govern-
ment provided no services.107 This assumption is based on a misap-
prehension of the nature of government, and certainly of modem 
government. In the aftermath of the New Deal, pervasive government 
regulation and services, rather than lack of government action, has 
been the norm. In light of pervasive government regulation and serv-
ices, the baseline of governmental inaction has not described the status 
quo ill at least half a century.1os 
Once inaction is rejected as the status quo, the Court's assumptions 
about state action become questionable. Recognition of pervasive gov-
ernment control would lead to an understanding that state action may 
consist, not only of direct state action, but of inaction as well. This is 
so because government is perpetual, and continually makes choices 
which affect its citizens. These choices create the conditions against 
which government's current actions and inactions are measured. 
When government chooses to maintain the status quo, it perpetuates a 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
108. This assumes that the baseline is used by the Court as a reflection of the status quo. It 
may instead be used normatively, as a description of what citizens are entitled to expect from 
government. See infra text accompanying notes 368-69. 
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condition for which it is largely responsible. 109 
Once government is viewed as ongoing, two things become clear. 
First, it can cause harm by its inaction, because its bureaucracy re-
mains in motion and its actions and omissions continue to affect peo-
ple. Second, it need not make matters worse than they were before 
government existed, since this is an improper baseline. 
The tort law analogy on which courts often rely is that government 
will be charged with an affirmative duty to act only when it has first 
placed an individual in a condition of helplessness or otherwise invited 
reliance on its protection.110 Even if this limitation is accepted, a real-
istic view of the ways in which government acts and causes harm dem-
onstrates that in the realm of social services, as in numerous other 
realms, government has invited reliance on its protection through reg-
ulation and provision of services, and has induced dependence on the 
continuation of those services through displacement of private 
alternatives. 111 
The second problem with the requirement for making things worse 
is that it insulates government from responsibility for its complicity, or 
its contribution to constitutional injury. In state action language, the 
question should not be simply whether the harm would have occurred 
without private action, but whether the government's acquiescence in 
that action infringed constitutional rights. 112 As the Court has some-
times recognized, 113 state and private forces may act symbiotically.114 
In such cases, a test focused on sole or immediate cause is misleading. 
By focusing on immediate, physical causes, the Court deflects atten-
tion from its complicity in the plight of the powerless. In causation 
language, the question should be whether the government's conduct, 
whether immediate or ongoing, was a substantial factor in causing the 
harm. If so, the government ought not to escape liability simply be-
cause other factors also contributed.11s 
109. See Brest, supra note 72, at 1322; Sunstein, supra note 70, at 889. In Sunstein's exam-
ple, the traditional treatment of poverty as "simply 'there' " is at odds with what is known about 
government's power to control wealth distribution. 
110. See Currie, supra note 28, at 873 & n.54. 
111. When the government's duty is framed in this way, it becomes clear that a government 
agency can be held responsible for its failure to act competently irrespective of whether it has a 
duty to exist in the first place. Whether, for example, DSS must exist to protect the children of 
Wisconsin is a much more difficult question, see infra note 326, and one whose consideration is 
completely unnecessary to the resolution of the DeShaney case. 
112. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); L. TRIBE, supra 
note 51, § 18-2, at 1692. 
113. 365 U.S. at 724-25. 
114. It can be argued that virtually any private action in which the state acquiesces impli-
cates the state. Brest, supra note 72, at 1301; Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 522. 
115. Eaton, supra note 105, at 452-61. But see Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. 
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Ultimately, the questions can be reduced to one: Did the govern-
ment breach a constitutional duty to the injured party? This question 
can be answered only by reference to a normative conception of the 
scope of the due process clause. The search for bright lines based on 
rules of state action and causation is a poor substitute for asking the 
unavoidable question: Should this harm be chargeable to the state 
under our conception of its proper role in preventing governmental 
harms? 
3. The Custody Limitation: The Requirement 
for Forced Physical Restraint 
The final issue of government responsibility raised by DeShaney is 
the question of the form the state action must take. Can the state 
cause harm only by a tangible, direct and physical interference with 
liberty, such as a beating by a state officer or while the victim is in 
physical custody, or might less tangible forms of harm, coercion and 
restraint be actionable? 
In this regard, the DeShaney court considered an argument by the 
plaintiff which sought to create an exception to the general rule that 
the state has no duty to protect against private dangers. The argument 
was that a special relationship arose between Joshua and the state be-
cause it knew he faced a special danger of abuse and promised to pro-
tect him against that danger, and that this relationship gave rise to a 
duty to protect. The Court held that this argument is available only to 
persons in custody.116 
The first cases finding a constitutional duty to protect were custody 
cases. In Estelle v. Gamble, 117 the Court held that prison officials must 
provide adequate medical care to those in custody.118 It reasoned that 
inmates must rely on prison authorities to provide medical care or not 
receive it at all; the failure to receive care could result in suffering 
violative of the eighth amendment. 119 In Youngberg v. Romeo, 120 the 
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). As Professor Eaton discusses in detail, the Mount Healthy stan-
dard, which the Court has used in mixed motive employment cases, rejects this notion in favor of 
a restrictive but-for test which imposes liability for discriminatory employment decisions only if 
the decisions would not otherwise have been reached. Eaton argues thnt this approach should 
not be extended beyond the mixed motive employment context, and that it is inconsistent with 
both common law tort causation principles and the goals of§ 1983. 
116. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004-05 (1989). 
117. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
118. However, the failure to do so would be actionable only if it rose to the level of deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs. 429 U.S. at 106. 
119. 429 U.S. at 104. The eighth amendment states: Excessive bail shnll not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
120. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
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Court found a state duty to the involuntarily committed mentally re-
tarded arising from the due process clause. It held that when a person 
is institutionalized and wholly dependent on the state a duty arises to 
provide certain minimal services.121 In Smith v. Wade, 122 the Court 
found due process had been violated when a prison guard recklessly 
placed two prisoners who had harassed, beaten and sexually assaulted 
the plaintiff in a cell with him.123 
The DeShaney court traced the origin of the affirmative duty to 
protect to the state's exercise of its power to restrain one's liberty 
through "incarceration, institutionalization, or [some] similar re-
straint."124 Therefore, since the state did not take Joshua into custody 
or otherwise play a part in the creation of the dangers he faced, it had 
no duty to protect him.12s 
For a number of reasons, the custody limitation is a problematic 
bright line. As Justice Brennan responded in his DeShaney dissent, 
Estelle and Youngberg do not rely on the state's act of incarceration or 
commitment, but on the failure to provide services once that incarcer-
ation has occurred. It was not the initial, unchallenged, deprivation of 
liberty which gave rise to a duty, but the nature of the confinement: 
the fact that it deprived the individual of other sources of aid.126 
By its emphasis on "involuntary commitment,"127 on restraints 
which "render [one] unable to care for himself,"128 and on taking an 
individual into custody "against his will,"129 the Court casts doubt on 
the state's duty to care for those who are so seriously impaired they 
have no choice but to be institutionalized, 130 or for children who have 
121. 457 U.S. at 324. 
122. 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 
123. But see Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), in which the Court held that no due 
process claim was available to a prisoner who had been injured after he had warned prison 
officials that he had been threatened by another prisoner, when the officials' failure to follow the 
appropriate procedures to protect him was merely negligent. Like its companion case, Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), Davidson presages DeShaney's approach. The Davidson opinion 
focused on the prison officials' failures to act, and classified them as negligent, and thus not rising 
to the level of a deprivation of due process. 474 U.S. at 347-48. As in DeShaney, the Court failed 
to see the omissions as conscious choices of a course of action. See Bandes, supra note 105, at 
110, 129. 
124. 109 S. Ct. at 1006. 
125. 109 S. Ct. at 1005-06. 
126. 109 S. Ct. at 1008-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
127. 109 S. Ct. at 1005. 
128. 109 S. Ct. at 1005 (emphasis added). 
129. 109 S. Ct. at 1005. 
130. As Justice Brennan notes in DeShaney, in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), 
Romeo had an "l.Q. of between 8 and 10, and the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child." 
109 S. Ct. at 1009. Thus it was not the state that rendered him incapable of taking care of 
himself. Id. 
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been voluntarily turned over to foster care.131 Yet these individuals 
are equally cut off by the state from other sources of aid, and depen-
dent on the state for protection. It is this condition of dependence 
which requires state assistance to safeguard due process rights. 
When the rationale for the imposition of duty is seen as the depri-
vation of other sources of aid, 132 the custody limitation becomes un-
workable. When police left children alone on a busy highway by 
arresting their guardian, they deprived the children of aid, although 
they did not put them in custody or even place them on the high-
way.133 Likewise, when the state undertook to help Joshua, within a 
regulatory structure which encouraged reliance on its promise to help 
him, it "effectively confined [him] within the walls of Randy 
DeShaney's violent home until such time as DSS took action to re-
move him."134 
Even based on the Court's rationale that the state must have 
played a part in the creation of the danger, the custody limitation is 
unsatisfactory. When a parole board releases a prisoner it knows to be 
dangerous, it has performed an affirmative act which creates danger. 
Although admittedly the parole board did not create the dangerous 
prisoner, neither did it do so in Smith v. Wade. 135 It did create a 
changed situation, as the people who failed to protect themselves be-
lieving their tormentors were safely in jail would attest. 136 
131. See, e.g., Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dept. of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 476 
(4th Cir. 1989), a post-DeShaney case which held that no state-imposed restraint of liberty oc-
curred when a plaintiff was voluntarily placed by his parents in foster care. It further held that 
since the foster parents' contract with the Department of Social Services did not contain a de· 
scription of the expected foster parent-foster child relationship, the child's physical abuse could 
not be attributed to the state's failure to supervise. Id. at 476-79. This holding is not so surpris-
ing in light of the language the DeShaney court used in declining to decide whether foster care 
may constitute custody: "Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua 
from free society and placed him in a foster home [he might be considered to be in custody]." 
109 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9 (emphasis added). But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) 
(acknowledging that children have liberty interests in not being institutionalized even when par-
ents seek institutionalization). 
132. See Note, supra note 35, at 950-55. 
133. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1008 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 29-33. In the lower court opinion in 
DeShaney, Judge Posner sought to distinguish Rochford by characterizing it as a case in which 
the police placed the victim in a situation of high risk. 812 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1987). 
Whether they indeed placed the children in the situation, or merely left them in it, as the Roch-
ford dissent argues, 592 F.2d at 392, (Kilkenny, J., dissenting), is exactly the sort of "tenuous 
metaphysical" debate which the action/inaction distinction necessitates, and which the Rochford 
majority declined to enter. 592 F.2d at 384. 
134. DeSlzaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
135. 461 U.S. 30 (1983). See text accompanying notes 122-23. 
136. Federal courts have uniformly refused to find a duty under federal law to protect the 
general public from released prisoners or mental patients. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 
277 (1980); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983); Bowers v. De Vito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 
1982). Cases like Martinez have indicated that the result might be different where the state knew 
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The custody limitation is the product of the Court's preoccupation 
with state actions which are not only affirmative in the traditional 
sense, but physically tangible. 137 Although the custody limitation is 
too narrow even in light of these criteria, the criteria themselves bear 
no relationship to the concerns of due process. The state decided to 
leave Joshua in a violent home, subjecting him to known danger. 
Whether the state acted or failed to act, whether it placed him at risk 
or left him at risk, whether Joshua's confinement was physical or 
based on practical, social, economic and emotional forces, 138 the result 
is the same. The state abused its power by subjecting Joshua to a 
known risk without giving him the help it had ensured only it could 
offer. 
C. The Penalty/Subsidy Distinction 
Another, closely related assumption which flows from the action/ 
inaction distinction is that although government may not penalize 
constitutionally protected activity, it is under no obligation to subsi-
dize it. To illustrate the facile cruelty of this questionable distinction, 
I turn to the abortion funding decisions which engendered it. 
In the first abortion funding cases, Beal v. Doe, 139 and Maher v. 
of a specific threat to a known person. See 444 U.S. at 285; DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.4; see 
also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 
(1976) (duty of psychiatrist to warn person of specific threat grounded in tort). But see Estate of 
Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1986) (no federal liability where state knew of specific 
threat to victim yet released dangerous mental patient), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). 
137. 109 S. Ct. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also C. MACPHERSON, Berlin's Division 
of Liberty, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: EssAYS IN RETRIEVAL 117 (1973). As Professor Tribe 
points out, the custody cases fail to provide a helpful framework for resolving the DeShaney case 
because they do not recognize the harms a state can inflict, not merely on individuals, but sys-
temically, as a result of its structure. Laurence Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: 
What Lawyers Can Leamfrom Modem Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1989). 
138. In the context of upholding the practice of juvenile preventive detention, Justice Rehn-
quist evinced an understanding that custody need not be physical: 
[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody. Children, by definition, are 
not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject 
to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as 
parens patriae. 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (citations omitted). See also The Supreme Court -
Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REv. 174 (1989) (Court's recognition of state's broad parens pa-
triae interest at odds with DeShaney Court's view of private sphere of child rearing insulated 
from state intervention). 
Borrowing from fourth amendment law, the issue might be framed as whether Joshua was 
free to leave. The Court has long recognized that one need not be physically restrained to be 
seized or arrested: the question is whether under the circumstances a reasonable person would 
believe he was free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). It is difficult to 
imagine where Joshua could have gone without state assistance. See also Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (liberty is more than just exemption from physical restraint). 
139. 432 U.S. 438 (1977). Beal held that the Social Security Act does not require states that 
participate in Medicaid to provide funding for nontherapeutic abortions. 
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Roe, 140 the Court upheld governmental decisions to exempt funding 
for nontherapeutic abortions from comprehensive Medicaid coverage 
which included funding for childbirth. In Harris v. McRae, 141 the 
Court reached a similar result regarding Medicaid funding of certain 
medically necessary abortions. Most recently, in Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services, 142 the Court upheld restrictions on the use of pub-
lic facilities and employees to perform medically necessary abortions. 
The abortion funding decisions, like the DeShaney decision, rest in 
large part on the Court's rejection of the concept of affirmative govern-
mental duties. Just as the Court in DeShaney avoided imposing a duty 
to protect, in the abortion funding cases it avoided imposing a duty to 
assist women in obtaining medical care. 
The Webster decision, for example, rejected a challenge to a Mis-
souri statute which placed several regulations and limitations on the 
performance of abortions in the state.143 Of relevance here is the 
Court's resolution of the challenge to a prohibition on the use of public 
facilities or employees to perform abortions. The challenged statutes 
made it unlawful "for any public employee within the scope of his 
employment to perform or assist an abortion, not necessary to save the 
life of the mother"; 144 and "for any public facility to be used for the 
purpose of performing or assisting an abortion not necessary to save 
the life of the mother."14s 
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his discussion for the Court with a 
citation from the DeShaney opinion: "[O]ur cases have recognized 
that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to 
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, 
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not 
deprive the individual."146 The Court reasoned that although the 
140. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Maher held that the equal protection clause does not require a 
state participating in the Medicaid program to fund nontherapeutic abortions although it pays 
for childbirth. See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (equal protection clause does not 
require municipal hospitals to provide facilities for elective abortions although they do so for 
childbirth). 
141. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
142. 109 s. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
143. Four sections of the Missouri Act were at issue: the preamble, which found that life 
begins at conception and that unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well· 
being (Mo. REV. STAT.§ 1.205.1(1),(2) (1986)); the prohibition on the use of public facilities or 
employees to perform abortions (Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 188.210, .215 (1986)); the prohibition on 
public funding of abortion counselling (Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.205 (1986)); and the requirement 
that physicians conduct viability tests prior to performing abortions (Mo. REV. STAT.§ 188.029 
(1986)). 109 S. Ct. at 3049. 
144. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.210 (1986). 
145. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.215 (1986). 
146. 109 S. Ct. at 3051 (quoting DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003). 
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State may not itself prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion, it 
need not assist her in obtaining one. 
The Court saw its decision upholding the restriction as a logical 
outgrowth of Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae. In those cases, the 
Court held that a state may "make a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion and ... implement that judgment by the allocation 
of public funds." 147 The Webster court found it a logical next step to 
permit implementing the value judgment through allocation of other 
public resources, such as hospitals and medical staff. 148 Although the 
Court of Appeals had found that preventing access to a public facility 
went beyond demonstrating a political choice in favor of childbirth, 
and actually narrowed or foreclosed the availability of abortion to wo-
men, 149 Justice Rehnquist rejected this reasoning: 
[T]he State's decision here to use public facilities and staff to encourage 
childbirth over abortion places no governmental obstacle in the path of a 
woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy . . . . Missouri's refusal 
to allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves 
a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not 
to operate any public hospitals at aII.150 
Webster, like Maher and Harris before it, purports to apply the 
same simple principle that engendered the DeShaney result. The 
Court casts the claim as one for basic government services; here, medi-
cal services. The Court assumes that there is no constitutional right to 
medical services, and that the government can withhold all such serv-
ices if it so chooses. This assumption provides the basis for compari-
son: the harm to indigent women is measured against a baseline of no 
services at all. The greater power to withdraw all medical services 
implies the lesser power to withdraw only some such services.151 
In short, the decision to withhold funding or use of public facilities 
is cast as a failure to give affirmative aid: the mere withholding of a 
benefit or subsidy. It is not an act of government interference or coer-
cion, but simply a legitimate choice by government not to help. The 
government has not interfered with the right of indigent women to 
obtain abortions; it has merely chosen not to subsidize the 
procedure. 152 
147. Maher. 432 U.S. at 474, quoted in Ha"is, 448 U.S. at 314. 
148. 109 S. Ct. at 3052. 
149. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1081 (8th Cir. 1988), revd., 109 
S. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
150. 109 S. Ct. at 3052 (citation omitted). 
151. As noted supra note 18, this power is limited by the unconstitutional conditions doc· 
trine. As will be discussed infra at text accompanying notes 159-67, this doctrine poses .:onsider-
able obstacles in the Webster context. 
152. See, e.g., Webster. 109 S. Ct. at 3052. 
2300 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:2271 
In both semantic and legal terms, the Court's meaning in describ-
ing these restrictions as mere decisions not to subsidize is elusive. 
One possible meaning is that the result of the restrictions is not to 
penalize at all. A second possible meaning is that the intent of the 
restrictions is not to penalize the exercise of the right to abortion; any 
penalty is only an innocent byproduct of the decision to fund child-
birth in preference to abortion. The third is that even if the states do 
intend to penalize the right, they may accomplish this end through a 
passive failure to subsidize, but not through an active use of penalty. 
In a very limited sense, the first meaning is correct: the Court did 
not see the loss of access to abortions for poor women as being a result 
of the funding restrictions. It recognized that many indigent women 
choosing abortions would no longer be able to obtain them once the 
restrictions were in force, 153 but attributed this not to the government 
restrictions themselves, but to the women's preexisting condition of 
indigency. 154 That is, it was not the government's action which caused 
this deprivation. This formulation rests on particular assumptions 
about state action, causation and the appropriate baseline for measur-
ing deprivation which will be considered shortly. 
As to the second meaning, if the Court meant to absolve the gov-
ernment of an intent to discourage abortion, it set itself an impossible 
task. The legislative history straightforwardly established that the leg-
islation was motivated by the purpose of discouraging abortion. 155 
Seemingly, the Court's own finding that the restrictions were meant to 
implement "a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion"156 es-
tablishes just such a purpose. 
153. The restrictions upheld in Harris have had this effect. See Trussell, Menken, Lindheim 
& Vaughan, The Impact of Restricting Medicaid Financing/or Abortion, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 
120 (1980). The Webster Court's not very reassuring remark that "[t]he challenged provisions 
only restrict a woman's ability to obtain an abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a 
physician affiliated with a public hospital" (109 S. Ct. at 3052) recalls Captain Black's explana-
tion to Milo Minderbender: "[T]his whole program is voluntary, Milo - don't forget that, The 
men don't have to sign [the] loyalty oath if they don't want to. But we need you to starve them to 
death if they don't. It's just like Catch-22. Don't you get it? You're not against Catch-22, are 
you?" JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH 22, at 113 (1955); see also Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052; Harris, 
448 U.S. at 314; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. 
154. Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474); Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052. 
155. As to Harris, see Michael Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong In the 
Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1125-26 
(1980); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term -Foreword: Unconstitutional Con-
ditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5, 89-90 (1988). As to 
Webster, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Missouri legislature "intended its abortion 
regulations to be understood against the backdrop of its theory oflife," which was that life begins 
at conception. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 851F.2d1071, 
1076 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
156. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474). 
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This is where the penalty/subsidy distinction comes in: it enables 
the Court to finesse the intent problem. The reasoning might be re-
duced to the following: (1) The purpose of withdrawing the subsidy 
was to burden the exercise of the right to abortion. (2) The effect of 
the withdrawal may be to burden the exercise of the right. (3) But the 
first two propositions are irrelevant because the withdrawal was not a 
direct, coercive action by the government, but merely a failure to as-
sist.· In.short, the third suggested meaning is the correct one: the gov-
ernment may accomplish the otherwise illegitimate end of 
purposefully burdening a protected right, so long as it achieves it by 
indirect subsidy, not direct penalty.151 
The abortion funding cases, then, have made the difference be-
tween a penalty and a subsidy crucially important, and in fact out-
come determinative.158 Although it would seem incumbent on the 
Court to explain why the distinction is legally significant, the question 
157. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1500-02 (decision "turned on the supposed absence of 
coercive acts, not on absence of rights-pressuring purpose"). 
158. The penalty/subsidy distinction has also been applied outside the abortion funding con-
text. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 87-89 (1976) (per curiam) the Court upheld a 
provision of the Campaign Finance Act which approved reimbursement of up to two million 
dollars for expenses to major political parties, a lesser amount to minor parties, and no reim-
bursement at all to parties or candidates which could not qualify as minor. The Maher Court 
cited Buckley for the proposition that interference with a protected right is prohibited, but en-
couragement of an alternate activity is not. 432 U.S. at 475. Maher interpreted Buckley to hold 
that the subsidy provisions did not burden the rights of the nonqualifying candidates, but merely 
enhanced the opportunities of the eligible candidates. Maher, 432 U.S. at 475-76 n.9 (citing 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94-95). For criticism of this reasoning, see Marlene Nicholson, Political 
Campaign Expenditure Limitations and the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine, 10 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 601, 616-17 (1983); see also Sunstein, supra note 70, at 883-84 (Court in Buckley 
assumes state must take disparities in wealth and consequent access to fora as "a part of nature 
for which government bears no responsibility"). 
The penalty/subsidy distinction has also been invoked in the context of congressional refusal 
to fund offensive art. In the wake of an outcry over a provocative photography exhibit which 
had been subsidized by a grant from the National Endowment of the Arts (NEA), Congress 
recently adopted a law which will enable it to withdraw such funding for exhibits the NEA 
judges to be obscene. See Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 738 (1989). Its proponents defend 
the law as a simple refusal to subsidize. See, e.g., Hilton Kramer, Is Art Above the Laws of 
Decency?, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1989, § 2, at 1, 7, cols. 1-5. There is some precedent for this 
position. See Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir.) (upholding content 
based withdrawal of arts funding on the theory that it does not constitute suppression, but rather 
promotion of another's work in its stead), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976). However, particu-
larly in light of the overwhelming power government has to determine artists' access, not only to 
grants, but to fora for the display of their work, see Grace Glueck, Border Skirmish: Art and 
Politics, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § 2, at 1, 22, cols. 1-5, and Paul Mattick Jr., Arts and the 
State: The N.E.A. Debate in Perspective, THE NATION, Oct. 1, 1990, at 348, the issue of whether 
the government may withhold funding from first amendment activity based on content may not 
be so clear cut. See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, Public Enterprise and Public Forum: A Comment on 
Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 255-59 (1976); Marlene Nichol-
son, The Constitutionality of Contribution Limitations in Ballot Measure Elections, 9 EcoLOGY 
L.Q. 683, 731-33 (1981); Kathleen Sullivan, A Free Society Doesn't Dictate to Artists, N. Y. Times, 
May 18, 1990, at A-31, col. 2. 
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is never addressed. Once the activity is labeled a mere subsidy, the 
Court treats the matter as closed. 
The Court's treatment of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
which would seem to pose an obstacle to the refusal to fund protected 
activity, is illustrative. The doctrine holds that government may not 
condition receipt of benefits on relinquishment of constitutional rights, 
even if the receipt of the benefits is otherwise a mere privilege.159 The 
Harris court admitted that under the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine a legislature may not withhold all Medicaid benefits from an 
otherwise eligible candidate simply because she has exercised her right 
to abortion. The Court reasoned, however, that a legislature may 
withhold the particular benefits which enable a woman to exercise that 
right, because "this represents simply a refusal to subsidize certain 
protected conduct ... [which] ... without more, cannot be equated 
with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity."160 That is, "denial 
of funding that enables a person to exercise a constitutional right is not 
a penalty, but denial of other benefits because he or she chooses to 
exercise such a right would be considered a penalty."161 
The distinction is baffling. The Court fails to explain why the re-
fusal to subsidize protected conduct does not violate the unconstitu-
tional conditions rule. The fact that the statute does not sweep more 
broadly to exempt unprotected conduct as well hardly clarifies the 
matter. The linchpin of the argument seems to be that a condition 
which would otherwise be unconstitutional is acceptable if it takes the 
form of a refusal to subsidize, rather than a penalty.162 
In what way does the refusal to subsidize differ from a penalty on 
protected activity? The Court's response is to invoke the "greater-in-
159. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963); L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 10-8, at 681. 
Thus, the doctrine represented a rejection of the right-privilege distinction, which held that when 
one receives a privilege from government, it may be withheld absolutely, and therefore may be 
withheld conditionally, though the condition is otherwise unconstitutional. See Justice Holmes' 
opinion in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892); see also 
Sullivan, supra note 18; Epstein, supra note 155; William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Nicholson, supra note 
158, at 612-14; and supra note 18 (discussing the greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine). 
160. 448 U.S. at 317 n.19. 
161. Nicholson, supra note 158, at 615. 
162. The Court may be saying that the refusal to subsidize abortion is germane to legitimate 
governmental objectives, but a withdrawal of all medicaid coverage for a woman who has exer-
cised her right to choice would not be germane. If so, the Court's reasoning illustrates Professor 
Sullivan's point that germaneness "is a poor benchmark for distinguishing constitutional from 
unconstitutional conditions." (Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions and the Distri-
bution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 327, 329-30 (1989)). If encouraging childbirth over 
abortion is a legitimate end, cutting off all medicaid benefits to women who choose abortion 
would be an effective way to accomplish it, and different only in degree from cutting off funding 
for the abortion itself. Conversely, if the right to abortion is constitutionally protected, it is not 
clear why either consequence should be acceptable. 
August 1990] Negative Constitution 2303 
eludes-the-lesser" argument. Since the government has no obligation 
to fund any medical procedures or provide any medical facilities, it 
may decide, for any reason, 163 not to fund particular procedures. This 
does not penalize because it leaves the woman in the same position she 
would have been in without any government intervention, and that 
position is fixed by her individual condition of poverty, rather than 
any affirmative act of the government.164 
The Court's invocation of the greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine 
completes an argument of nearly perfect circularity. This doctrine, 
initially an attempt to claim governmental freedom from any restric-
tions on its largess, was severely limited by the ascendancy of the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine. 165 As Justice Brennan pointed out 
in his dissent in Harris, the demise of the right-privilege distinction 
means that government may no longer premise a grant of gratuitous 
benefits on the relinquishment of constitutional rights. 166 The Court 
disingenuously responded that the government's withholding of fund-
ing had done nothing to force relinquishment of the right to choose 
abortion; it has merely made it more attractive not to exercise it. 167 
Several unstated assumptions underlie the Court's reasoning. 
First, there is the choice of a baseline. Justice Brennan argued that the 
Hyde amendment, at issue in Harris, imposed unconstitutional condi-
tions because it deprived women of benefits to which they were other-
wise entitled.168 Thus, Justice Brennan judged the results of the 
legislation in comparison to the status quo ante, which included full 
coverage for medically necessary services.169 In contrast, the majority 
used as its point of comparison a time before there was any subsidized 
health care at all. It treated the baseline of government inaction as the 
only logical point of comparison. When compared to a complete fail-
ure to subsidize, a government decision to fund childbirth but not 
abortion can only be seen as an expansion of opportunities for indigent 
women. 170 
The argument that government has taken no action, or at least no 
163. This is the "greater includes the lesser" doctrine in its most archaic form. See supra 
note 18; see also The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 100 (1980) ("[a] state 
cannot refuse to extend benefits on a forbidden basis, even if the refusal creates no government 
obstacle to the exercise of a right"). 
164. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989). 
165. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1458-61. 
166. Harris v. McRae, 484 U.S. 297, 334-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
167. Id. at 315-16. 
168. See id. at 336 n.6. 
169. See id. at 332-37. 
170. See Epstein, supra note 155, at 90. 
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~oercive action, because it has not made women worse off than they 
were twenty-five years ago, 171 has some obvious fiaws.1 72 First, it as-
sumes that the propriety of the government's conduct and motivation 
can be judged solely by reference to its results. 173 Second, it presents a 
woman's "choice" in the starkest possible terms, then concludes that 
forcing women to choose the lesser evil is not coercive. But the fact 
that women could be threatened with the loss of all subsidized medical 
care does not render voluntary their choice to lose only subsidized 
abortion. 174 Finally, it is simply impossible to know whether women 
would have been worse off twenty-five years ago. Pervasive subsidies 
have existed for a long time, and they have changed the landscape so 
irrevocably that it is no longer possible to know what health care op-
tions would have been open to poor women if subsidized care had not 
displaced them. 175 
Even assuming for the moment that "making things worse" should 
be the standard, the restrictions at issue in Webster would likely satisfy 
it. The ban on the use of public facilities defined "public" so broadly 
that, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, it would apply to the many 
privately owned facilities using property which is publicly owned, 
leased or controlled.176 Here the government's role as landowner and 
171. The Medicaid program was adopted in 1965. 
172. Once again it should be noted that this argument has ramifications for both state action 
and causation: the question of whether the state, by its action, caused the harm, or whether it 
was caused by private forces. See supra note 95. 
173. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 163-70 (1963) (need for motive anal-
ysis in due process context); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (need for motive 
analysis in equal protection context). 
-. , 174. See Seidman, supra note 69, at 78-79; SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in 
FOUR EssAYS ON LIBERTY 130, 130 n.1 (1970). 
175. Since abortion was not legal in 1965, history provides no indication of what abortion 
facilities would have been available to poor women before the advent of subsidized medical care. 
176. 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A four-member plurality voted to 
uphold §§ 188.200 and .215 of the Missouri statute. Justice O'Connor declined to consider a 
facial challenge to the provisions on the ground that they might have some constitutional appli-
cations. 109 S. Ct. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Even prior to Webster, there was evidence that the refusal by public hospitals to perform abor-
tions may also exert pressure on the few completely private hospitals which might have provided 
abortion services. See L. Belkin, Women in Rural Areas Face Many Barriers to Abortion, N.Y. 
Times, July 11, 1989, at Al, col. 3; see also ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT, SUM-
MARY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 25 (1989): 
The Court's approval of this provision will make other states more likely to attempt to 
prohibit abortion at public facilities. Restricting access to hospital-based abortion will harm 
women who require hospitalization for abortion services because of life-threatening medical 
conditions; women who need late abortions because they discover late in pregnancy that the 
fetus has severe anomalies; rural women and poor women who often depend on local public 
hospitals as their primary medical providers; and teenagers who tend to seek abortion Inter 
in pregnancy and who often face greater health risks than adult women. Worst of all, be-
cause many "public" hospitals are also teaching institutions, fewer and fewer practitioners 
will acquire the expertise either to perform abortions or to remedy the effects of botched 
abortions. 
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provider of monopoly utilities177 provides a graphic illustration of the 
pervasive _reach of its power, in the face of which the individual's abil-
ity to protect her own rights to access is severely compromised. The 
traditional conception of the government as a passive entity forbidden 
to provide services is at odds with its identity as a major economic 
player in its own right.11s 
As to the correctness of the "making things worse" standard itself, 
the criticisms of that standard were presented earlier.179 The abortion 
funding cases show why the standard is insufficient in the context of 
indigency. 
The requirement for making things worse is intertwined with the 
Court's assumptions about choice and fault. The assumptions are 
twofold: a woman's indigency is of her own making, or at least not the 
government's fault; and it is that indigency which prevents her from 
obtaining an abortion. Beginning with the latter assumption, it is a 
dangerous half truth. Certainly if a woman could afford an abortion 
she would not need government assistance or government facilities. 
But in the context of subsidized health care, her indigency is an im-
pediment only because the government has acted to single out this 
procedure as one it will not protect from the vagaries of the free mar-
ket.180 Given that the right is constitutionally protected, a strong ar-
gument can be made that at minimum government is required to 
maintain a neutral stance toward its exercise, if not to make affirma-
tive efforts to safeguard its exercise.181 In any case, it defies common 
sense to argue that the government's choice is not a substantial cause 
of the woman's inability to obtain an abortion.182 
The concept of the vagaries of the free market raises the former 
See also Frances Olsen, Comment: Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REv. 105, 105 n.5 
(1989) (effect of Webster decision in Missouri has been to lead "public and private hospitals to 
refuse to allow abortions ... and one state university to bar talk of abortion."). 
177. The appellees and amici in Webster suggested that the ban was so broadly worded that 
it could be enforced against private hospitals using public water and sewer lines. See 109 S. Ct. at 
3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
178. See Regina Austin, The Problem of the Legitimacy of the Welfare State, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1510, 1511 (1982) (government is both "the regulator and the competitor of private eco-
nomic concerns"). 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 95-115. 
180. Tribe, supra note 9, at 336. 
181. Id. at 338-40; see also Perry, supra note 155, at 1122; Margaret Radin, Market-Inaliena-
bility, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1900-01 (1987). As the Griffin-Douglas line of cases has recog-
nized in the equal protection context, government may under certain conditions be required to 
subsidize some services to ensure that the inability to afford them does not effect a forced waiver. 
See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
182. 448 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See discussion of causation and complicity 
supra text accompanying notes 112-15. 
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assumption: that a woman's indigency is of her own making, or not 
the government's fault. Professor Macpherson's critique of Berlin's 
division of liberty is relevant: 
Vulgar proponents of free enterprise [may argue that poverty and depen-
dence are not the result of other people's arrangements]. But free enter-
prise theories of any standing from Adam Smith to Bentham to Mill ..• 
have recognized that it is indeed arrangements made by other human 
beings (as well as differences in native abilities and industriousness) that 
determine the distribution of wealth and poverty .... [This distribution] 
is a matter of social institutions, [which decide how property is to be 
held or controlled] .... [This] unequal access ... diminishes ... negative 
liberty, since dependence on others . . . diminishes the area in which 
[people] cannot be pushed around.183 
The abortion funding cases are testimony to the fact that people 
without resources, dependent on government for the ability to exercise 
their constitutional rights, can be pushed around. Webster provides 
perhaps the most dramatic illustration of Macpherson's point, since it 
reveals the extent of government's control over property, and the ease 
with which, in denying access to that property, it can diminish essen-
tial liberties. 
The response, that the loss of liberty is caused by the marketplace, 
not the government, is too facile. It is uncontroversial that govern-
ment activity affects wages, prices and job and housing availability,184 
and protects certain entitlements but not others.185 While the extent 
to which government activity affects the incidence of poverty is a sub-
ject of disagreement, 186 the Court's comfortable assumption that the 
woman unable to afford a private abortion has brought her plight 
upon herself with no help from her government does not bear close 
scrutiny.187 
183. C. MACPHERSON, supra note 137, at 100-01; see also Frances Olsen, The Family and the 
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1515 (1983) (laissez 
faire theory denies or particularizes and privatizes inequality). 
184. See Bendich, supra note 20, at 413-14. 
185. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970); Morris Cohen, Property and Sover-
eignty, 13 CoRNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The 
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965). 
186. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 178, at 1511; Richard A. Epstein, The Uncertain Quest for 
Welfare Rights, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 201, 225-29; Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Di-
chotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1431 
(1982); see also Passell, Forces in Society, and Reaganism, Helped Dig Deeper Hole for Poor, N.Y. 
Times, July 16, 1989, at 1, cols. 4-5; 12, cols. 6-8,. 
187. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) ("We have come to recognize that 
forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty."); L. TRIBE, supra note 51, 
§ 16-49. See also Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1499 n.366 (although government does not create 
poverty, "it does create a hierarchy between women who are and are not dependent on public 
medical insurance when it enacts a selective subsidy"). Fran Olsen unmasks another wrong 
assumption about choice and fault in the abortion debate: that women almost always exercise a 
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Ultimately, the Court's holdings in Harris and Webster, whether 
cast in terms of due process or equal protection, 188 of state action, 
unconstitutional conditions, or causation, depend for their support on 
the proposition that a refusal to subsidize is per se permissible nonin-
terference. What is never explained in the Court's opinions is the ra-
tionale for the foundation on which the entire abortion funding edifice 
is built: that there is a legally significant difference between a penalty 
and a subsidy. 
Government cannot imprison or fine a woman for exercise of the 
right to abortion. Although government cannot fine her, perhaps it 
may charge her money, although it is providing all other medical serv-
ices for free. This may be consistent with the Court's refusal to impose 
affirmative funding obligations.189 But under what meaning of the 
word would this charge be anything other than a penalty?190 It cer-
tainly imposes a tangible disadvantage on the woman by virtue of her 
choice of abortion over childbirth.191 If the government itself may not 
levy a charge, the question arises whether it can exempt abortion from 
a comprehensive scheme of subsidized medical care for the indigent, 
when the effect will be identical: to impose a charge which the 
targeted women cannot afford to pay. 192 The crucial question, again, 
is under what theory this action avoids being called a penalty.193 
free, uncoerced choice about whether to have sexual intercourse. Olsen, supra note 176, at 124-
26. 
188. In Harris, the equal protection claim fell based on the due process finding. Because the 
court found that a mere refusal to subsidize could not burden due process rights and that there-
fore no fundamental right had been violated, it saw no reason to use strict scrutiny in addressing 
the equal protection claim that the state had unfairly singled out abortions for differential treat-
ment. Under minimal scrutiny, it upheld the claim. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 322-23. But see 448 
U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Robert Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens 
and Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 978, 1009-17 (1981). 
189. 448 U.S. at 318. 
190. See JOEL FEINBERG, The Idea of a Free Man. in RIGHTS, JusncE AND THE BOUNDS 
OF LIBERTY: EssAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 8 (1980). 
191. "Penalty: A punishment imposed for breach of law, rule, or contract; a loss, disability 
or disadvantage of some kind ... ; sometimes specifically the payment of a sum of money im-
posed in such a case .... " THE CoMPACT EDmON OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
(1971). 
192. Harris, 448 U.S. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
193. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1497 n.358 (same danger is posed whether the state uses 
sanctions or bribes); Epstein, supra note 155, at 90 (Harris sidesteps bar on fines by offering 
financial inducements). But see Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats and Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 289, 303-308 (1989) (arguing that an offer to increase benefits (or 
subsidize) is less troublesome than a threat to decrease them (or penalize), especially in context of 
government benefit programs). The use of the encourage/discourage dichotomy, see Harris, 448 
U.S. at 315 (basic difference between interference with a protected activity and encouragement of 
an alternate activity), is equally elusive. There are many possible ways to encourage childbirth. 
See Brief for a Group of American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 
28-29, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) (States may 
encourage respect for human life by assuring that women do not become pregnant as a result of 
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The Court's only real answer to the question is to restate its con-
clusion. A failure to subsidize is not a penalty because it is not an act, 
it is a failure to act. It does not coerce, it does not place obstacles in a 
woman's way. 
Yet the government can coerce and create obstacles by selectively 
withholding funding or access to public health care from those with no 
other viable options.194 Although the imposition of legal control takes 
a more subtle form than a fine or imprisonment, the result, like the 
purpose, may be exactly the same. 195 The question the Court should 
have addressed in the abortion funding cases was whether the right to 
abortion is important enough to protect from the inevitable burdens 
imposed by the government's choices.196 
It may well be that the Court did make a value choice about the 
protection to which the right to abortion is entitled, and therefore rati-
fied the government choices it reviewed in Harris and Webster. 197 This 
is a substantially different matter from presenting the entire sequence 
as a series of failures to act. Just as government deliberately acted to 
discourage abortion, so did the Court make a decision to ratify these 
acts, a decision which will ensure that the obstacles remain in place, 
and which was not compelled by the nearly inyisible distinction be-
tween a penalty and a subsidy. 
III. THE CHARTER OF NEGATIVE LIBERTIES: LOOSING THE 
TENACIOUS GRIP OF THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
The idea of the Constitution as a charter of negative liberties, 
which pervades the judicial way of talking about constitutional rights, 
is much more than a rhetorical flourish. It translates into a restrictive 
series of assumptions about governmental action which serves to ex-
clude whole categories of government misconduct and individual suf-
fering from the ambit of constitutional protection. These assumptions 
have been treated as virtually sacrosanct. To call the Constitution a 
involuntary sexual relations, by making adequate contraceptive counseling available, enhancing 
health education and medical care, providing assurance of adequate support for lives of children 
against starvation and malnutrition, violence, abuse and disease, and by setting example through 
its own treatment of women and children.). The schemes in Harris and Webster appear to en· 
courage childbirth through a different method: discouraging abortion. 
194. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 332-34. 
195. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 190, at 8. 
196. Tribe, supra note 9, at 335-36; Perry, supra note 155; Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 343-45 (1989). 
197. Had the Court made such a choice explicitly, it would have been forced to confront the 
fact that it was impermissible under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Perry, supra note 
155; The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 163, at 104-05; Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1457 
n.358; see also Tribe, supra note 9, at 336. 
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charter of negative rights is to state a conclusion; yet the Court has 
mistaken conclusory rhetoric for the reasoning which should have pre-
ceded it. 
This Part seeks to understand why the conventional wisdom about 
negative liberties has held constitutional jurisprudence in such power-
ful sway. It first examines the constitutional arguments against affirm-
ative duties and concludes that they are only a small part of the 
explanation for their wholesale rejection. It then looks to the philo-
sophical and common law sources of the conventional wisdom in or-
der to trace the deeply entrenched assumptions underlying the 
rejection of affirmative duties. Finally, it examines the tenacious argu-
ments against affirmative duties which can be loosely characterized as 
"slippery slope" objections. 
This Part seeks to show that although the conventional wisdom 
about negative and affirmative rights presents itself as neutral and in-
exorable, rather than as a particular way of thinking, shaped by partic-
ular influences, 198 it is instead an amalgam of vestigial common law 
notions, individualistic political philosophy, originalist constitutional 
theory, and fear of the slippery slope. More accurately, it relies on 
deeply rooted notions about common law and philosophy and makes 
little attempt to understand the Constitution on its own terms. Yet 
major constitutional decisions have been based on an unquestioning 
belief in the rightness of this way of thinking. 
It will argue that none of the traditional assumptions is entitled to 
a priori status. Each represents a choice: about the extent of reliance 
on the common law, and the interpretation of the common law relied 
on; about the particular philosophic tradition adhered to; about the 
allocation of resources, and, ultimately, about the values the Constitu-
tion should protect. When the assumptions are treated as neutral and 
inexorable, the result is choices which are unarticulated and 
unjustified. 
A. The Constitutional Source 
According to the conventional wisdom, the source of the refusal to 
recognize positive constitutional rights is the Constitution: its text and 
the intent of the Framers. In a recent article, Professor David Currie 
set forth the classic argument for the proposition that the conventional 
wisdom, at least in the due process context, is justified by the Constitu-
tion itself. 199 He argued that the lack of affirmative due process rights 
198. Martha Minow says: "Unstated reference points lie hidden in legal discourse, which is 
full of the language of abstract universalism." Minow, supra note 37, at 44-45. 
199. Currie argues that a distinction exists between positive and negative constitutional 
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could be inferred irom the language and context of the clause: "the 
due process clause is phrased as a prohibition, not an affirmative com-
mand," in contrast to other constitutional guarantees, such as the 
right to counsel.200 He further argued that the ratification debates 
support the idea that "the Bill of Rights was designed to protect 
against 'abuse of ... power[]' ... , and in particular to limit the powers 
of Congress" and not to help needy citizens.20 1 In fact, he argued, the 
Framers were not even sure Congress had the power to help needy 
citizens. 202 
The conventional argument, then, is that the refusal to recognize 
affirmative governmental obligations is supported by the text of the 
Constitution and the Framers' intent. Both foundations are flimsy. 
The conventional wisdom portrays the text and Framers' intent as ob-
jective measures of the Constitution's meaning. However, text and in-
tent lead to a rejection of affirmative governmental duties only when 
certain interpretational choices are made. 
The argument from the Framers' intent assumes the legitimacy of 
an originalist mode of interpretation: that the Court should enforce 
only those values that are clearly stated in the text of the Constitution 
or intended by the Framers.203 The conventional wisdom relies on the 
Framers' intent and the conditions which prevailed at the time the 
Constitution was drafted. The Framers' intent was neither monolithic 
nor crystal clear in this regard. Scholars have argued that even if the 
sole intent was to keep government from invading the private realm, 
the Framers sought to accomplish this goal by imposing on govern-
ment affirmative obligations to provide certain safeguards. The pur-
pose of these safeguards was to prevent government from dominating 
its citizens by virtue of its tremendous power.204 On a more utopian 
note, scholars have argued that the Framers imposed affirmative obli-
gations to enforce the social contract and to enable citizens to realize 
rights, and that as a general rule only negative rights are protected by the due process clause. He 
notes, however, that the notion that the Constitution protects negative liberties should not be 
used as a "talisman capable of resolving a broad spectrum of problems against the existence of 
governmental duties that can in some sense be deemed affirmative." Currie, supra note 28, at 
887. 
200. Id. at 865. 
201. Id. at 874. 
202. Currie, supra note 28, at 865-66; see also Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221 
(7th Cir. 1988) ("Amendments designed to protect the people from the government •.• adopted 
when governmental services were more likely to be viewed as forbidden than desirable • • • 
phrased as prohibitions on governmental action . . . are not a plausible source of mandatory 
rescue services.") 
203. See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). 
204. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 333-34; Michelman, supra note 20, at 9. 
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the promises of the Declaration of Independence.205 
Moreover, the extent of reliance on the Framers' intent involves 
choices. The originalist approach which interprets the Constitution 
based solely on the plain meaning of the text and the verifiable intent 
of the Framers has been criticized widely.206 Even if the intent of the 
Framers is agreed to be the sole proper inquiry, it is necessary to de-
cide whether their specific intent will be required, or their more gen-
eral intent will suffice.207 If, for example, the Framers' general intent 
was to disable government from dominating citizens by virtue of its 
unequal power, that intent may be effectuated through positive obliga-
tions to protect as well as negative constraints. 208 
Finally, even assuming the notion of a negative constitution accu-
rately describes the late eighteenth century, any argument to impose it 
on the late twentieth century must reckon with the vast changes which 
have occurred since the 1930s. The welfare state, with its proliferation 
of government regulation and subsistence programs, little resembles 
the polity with which the Framers were familiar.209 To construe cur-
rent constitutional protections based on an antiquated world view is a 
choice which may be difficult to justify.210 
The argument from the text of the Constitution suffers from simi-
lar disabilities. The text of the Constitution does not support tl~e idea 
that, as a whole, it was meant to be solely a charter of negative rights. 
Although many of the rights it provides are phrased negatively,211 
205. See Bendich, supra note 20, at 409; Charles Black, Further Reflections on the Constitu-
tional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1103 (1986); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Cen-
tury of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor. 39 HAsrlNGs L.J. 1, 21 (1987); 
Miller, supra note 20, at 245-46. • 
206. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980). 
207. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of 
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1085 (1981). Professors Wasserstrom 
and Seidman illustrate this point in the fourth amendment context. A rigid originalist approach 
might limit the reach of that amendment to the "general warrants that angered the colonists in 
the pre-Revolutionary period." A more flexible originalist might attempt to detenriine whether 
modern intrusions like wiretaps or drug tests serve as the "modern equivalent of general war-
rants." Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitu-
tional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 57-58 (1988); see also Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 395-409. 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29, 50-55. 
209. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1455 n.170; Sunstein, supra note 70, at 886-88; Kreimer, 
supra note 9, at 1295. 
210. "Due process was not restricted to rules fixed in the past, for that 'would be to deny 
every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement.' " 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176-77 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884)); see also Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 207, at 58 
(preference for Framers' preferences must be justified). 
211. See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law); art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 5 (no tax or duty on articles exported from any state); art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (no title of nobility 
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many are also phrased affirmatively.212 Even as to the rights which 
are phrased negatively, their enforcement may require the imposition 
of affirmative obligations on government.213 The conventional wisdom 
treats the affirmative rights as exceptions to the general rule, but there 
is nothing inexorable about this conclusion. 
More specifically, the language of the due process clause does not 
mandate the conclusion that it prohibits only affirmative acts, and not 
omissions. Although its language prohibits certain deprivations, it af-
firmatively demands that when the government does deprive, it must 
afford due process of law, something which only the government can 
provide. 214 Finally, to say that the clause protects against abuse of 
power says very little about the form such abuse must take, or specifi-
cally, about whether government can abuse by its inaction as well as 
its action. 21s 
Invariably, assertions about the text of the Constitution and the 
Framers' intent seem to overlook the fourteenth amendment. The 
fourteenth amendment is the product of a radical shift in the percep-
tion of the duties of the federal government.216 Its legislative history 
shall be granted by United States); amend. I ("Congress shall make no law"); amend. II (the 
right to bear arms shall not be infringed); amend. VIII ("excessive bail shall not be required"). 
212. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("House of Representatives shall be composed of"); 
art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (privilege of writ of habeas corpus); art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (regular statement and 
account of receipts and expenditures shall be published); art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (President will pre· 
serve, protect and defend the Constitution); amend. IV (warrant and probable cause require-
ments); amend. V (grand jury requirement); amend. VI (right to speedy, public jury trial; 
confrontation, compulsory process, counsel); amend. VII (right to civil jury trial); see supra notes 
24-29 and accompanying text. 
213. See, e.g., supra note 51 (discussion of the first amendment). Professor Arthur Selwyn 
Miller points out that any time the Court decides a norm-creating case, it is imposing affirmative 
duties on the organs of government to enforce that norm. See Miller, supra note 20, at 229-35. 
As I have argued, all judicial decisionmaking creates norms because it creates precedent. See 
Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 299 (1990). Thus, all decisions impose 
affirmative duties of enforcement. The remedial question of the form that enforcement must take 
(e.g., preclusion of other courts, damages paid by offending entity, simple negative injunction or 
complex structural injunction against entity) must be kept distinct from questions about the 
existence of the enforcement duties themselves. See infra text accompanying notes 354-64. 
214. The due process clause provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law •... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This seems little 
different from: If any State deprives a person of life, liberty, or property, it must provide due 
process oflaw. See J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 121 (1965) (due process imposes affirm· 
ative obligations on government to protect against private action); ROBERT JENNINGS HARRIS, 
THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 42-44 (1960) (same); Tribe, supra note 9, at 331 (government may 
have to make an affirmative exertion to protect rights, e.g., it cannot dispense with a hearing to 
save time or money). 
215. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 20, at 209 (government power to do nothing is itself a signifi-
cant power); see also William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A 
Cn'tique and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 515, 567-70 (1989) 
(failure to act can constitute abuse of power); Sunstein, supra note 70, at 888 (whether there is a 
deprivation depends on antecedent conceptions of entitlement). 
216. See L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 7-2, at 550. 
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reflects that an overriding purpose of its passage was to require the 
federal government to protect its citizens in the face of the states' fail-
ure to do so. A strong argument can be made that both the equal 
protection and due process clauses were meant to impose on govern-
ment an affirmative duty to protect against private action.217 
In short, neither the language nor the history of the Constitution 
prohibits affirmative government duties. The arguments against af-
firmative duties are based on a series of choices: methodological 
choices on one level, but ultimately substantive choices about the role 
of government. In light of their indeterminacy, the arguments from 
the language and text of the Constitution might seem a flimsy basis for 
such sweeping choices about the scope of constitutional protection. 
The ease and tenacity with which these arguments have been accepted 
is partially explained by their pervasive presence in W estem thought. 
B. The Philosophical and Common Law Sources 
The antipathy toward affirmative duties is drawn from the Anglo-
American common law. The common law in tum reenacts and is sup-
ported by the conventional strain of Western political philosophy. 
Therefore, the constitutional rationales for this antipathy are profita-
bly discussed in the context of the common law and Western political 
thought. This section analyzes the philosophical, political and com-
mon law roots of the conventional wisdom and the intersection among 
them. 
1. Philosophical Roots 
The proscription against affirmative duties has an impressive line-
age. Professor Judith Shklar describes a conventional wisdom about 
justice, articulated by Aristotle, and accepted by Hobbes and Kant, 
which condemns only "active injustice"218 and "ignores the ills that 
we cause by simply letting matters take their course."219 However, 
this ancient reluctance to condemn inaction has always been counter-
poised by an alternative way of thinking. The Platonic model of jus-
217. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 214, at 118-21; HARRIS, supra note 214 at 42-44; Michael 
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughterhouse: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the 
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409, 417 (1990) (intent of framers of the fourteenth amendment 
was to expand governmental power and create enforceable affirmative rights to due process and 
equal protection); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 
341 (1949). 
218. Judith Shklar, Giving Injustice Its Due, 98 YALE L.J. 1135, 1146 (1989). 
219. Id. at 1142. Under this model, justice is achieved by adopting rules for distribution of 
goods, and then setting up institutions to maintain those rules in the course of private exchanges 
and to punish violators. Shklar refers to this as the "normal way of thinking about justice." Id. 
at 1136; see also Radin, supra note 181, at 1898 n.186. 
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tice developed alongside the Aristotelian, and, according to Shklar, 
was transformed by Cicero from a purely philosophical to a political 
conception.220 This model viewed injustice not only as active miscon-
duct, but as indifference to wrongdoing as well. 
When [the passively unjust man] sees an illegal action or a crime, he just 
looks the other way. If he is a public official his offence is very grave. 
He is the tyrant who condones injustice by ignoring it, or an indifferent 
ruler who does nothing to mitigate and prevent the social and natural 
disasters that affiict all of us.22I 
Before discussing why the conventional strain has continued to 
eclipse the alternative strain, it is helpful to first distinguish, as Shklar 
does, the philosophical and political versions of the conventional story. 
The philosophical version rests on the assumptions that individuals 
are atomistic and motivated by self interest, and that the optimal soci-
ety is one in which each individual is left alone to do as he wishes so 
long as he causes no harm to others.222 John Stuart Mill's often 
quoted definition of liberty as the freedom to engage in self-regarding 
conduct is the best known articulation of the purely individualistic 
view.223 Sir Isaiah Berlin later called Mill's position the "'negative' 
conception of liberty in its classical form": all coercion is bad, all non-
interference is good. 224 
In its political version, the conventional story makes identical as-
sumptions about the role of government. Its optimal role is noninter-
ference, or at least the smallest amount of interference necessary to 
permit individuals to exercise the greatest degree of freedom without 
encroaching on others.225 Berlin's essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, 226 is 
perhaps the most influential explication of the distinction between pos-
itive and negative liberty and the preference for the latter. For Berlin, 
a government which safeguarded negative liberty was simply one 
which created no external obstacles to individual freedom, whereas a 
government which sought to provide positive liberty was one which 
prescribed the nature or content of. that freedom. He feared that 
220. Shklar, supra note 219, at 1141-47. 
221. Id. at 1142-43. 
222. However, as Professor Olsen explained, a very different set of assumptions informed the 
"family sphere." This sphere, which was (or is) perceived as female and private, was thought to 
be motivated by woman's altruism and instinct to nurture. Thus a social order based on women's 
willingness to sacrifice their individual interests for the sake of male dominance of the family and 
for the sake of the children was seen as merely the way of nature. Olsen, supra note 183, at 1505. 
223. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (C. Shields ed. 1956) (1859); Lloyd L. Weinreb, 
The Complete Idea of Justice, SI U. CHI. L. REv. 752, 791 (1984). 
224. I. BERLIN, supra note 174, ·at 128. 
225. See J. MILL, supra note 223, at 16-17. 
226. I. BERLIN, supra note 174. 
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although the impulse to positive freedom might begin benignly as an 
attempt to remove internal obstacles to happiness by ensuring that 
government helped citizens, citizens helped each other, and citizens 
participated in government, it would eventually lead to totalitarian-
ism. The only sure way to avoid this trap was to ask of government 
only that it leave its citizens alone.227 Although the definition has al-
ways engendered controversy,228 it has long exerted a powerful, even 
predominant, influence on legal thought. As Professor Mark Tushnet 
explained: 
[The preference for negative rights reflects] fear that others ... will act 
to crush our individuality .... But we also know that we need other 
people to create the conditions under which we can flourish as social 
beings, and thus we need positive rights. In our culture, the fear of being 
crushed by others so dominates the desire for sociality that our body of 
rights consists largely of negative ones. 229 
Although philosophers have long debated whether man's essential 
nature tends toward autonomy or sociality, individualism or collectiv-
ism, the question as posed seems unanswerable. 230 A more concrete 
question, which cannot be fully considered here,231 is why the individ-
ualist strain, rather than the collectivist, has, to all appearances, be-
come ascendant. In brief, scholars have credited certain historical 
conditions, particularly in the eighteenth-century United States, with 
providing fertile ground for individualism to flourish. Both the psy-
chology of the emerging nation and the needs of the industrial revolu-
tion contributed to its growth. 
In John Dewey's words: 
[I]t was an easy step from the restrictions imposed on the colonies by 
Great Britain to the idea that all government by its very nature tends to 
be repressive, and that the great aim in political life is to limit the en-
croachments of governments in order to make secure the liberty of 
citizens. 232 
The conventional wisdom sees the public sphere as something to be 
227. Id. at 130-70; MACPHERSON, supra note 137, at 105-16. 
228. See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, supra note 190; MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, 16 
PHIL. REv. 312 (1967). 
229. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1392. 
230. On the merits, there seems no definitive way to resolve the debate about the essence of 
human nature. More to the point, the question as framed is unanswerable, because it rests on a 
false duality. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, ch. VIII, at 474, reprinted in SOCIAL 
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74 (social and individual tendencies inextricably inter-
twined). See infra text accompanying notes 248-51. 
231. A detailed discussion of the historical roots of individualism is beyond both the scope of 
this article and the author's expertise. 
232. Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 492-93. 
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feared.233 The articulated premise is the primacy of the value of indi-
vidual autonomy over societal values like cooperation, participation 
and mercy. There is an equally strong, unarticulated, premise: that 
individuals are on equal footing and can fend for themselves without 
the assistance of government.234 This is not to say that all people are 
equally strong, quick or intelligent, but that no structural imbalances 
or hierarchies exist which might require intervention.235 If govern-
ment will simply leave us alone, and we leave each other alone, the 
resulting order will be just. 
The second fertile ground for individualism, according to Dewey, 
was the industrial revolution.236 Certain laissez-faire doctrines were 
needed to help unshackle developing industry from limits imposed by 
feudal and agrarian customs.237 It was most important to protect the 
freedom to contract and to retain the fruits of one's labor. As Dewey 
argues, these tenacious assumptions have long outlasted the conditions 
which gave rise to them. What might have begun as a recognition that 
these freedoms were needed to achieve certain immediate aims was 
generalized to a belief that governmental protection of contract and 
property is neutral and natural, or not government action at all. In 
contrast, governmental attempts to protect other interests, such as the 
right to a fair wage or job security, were viewed as political or artificial 
efforts to interfere with the natural order.238 
233. Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1392; see also Austin, supra note 178, at 1517-18. 
234. Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 494; cf. Olsen, supra note 183, at 1527 (free market 
ideology legitimates status quo by asserting juridical equality). 
235. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATIER, FORM AND POWER OF A COM· 
MONWEALTH EcCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL 183 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1968) ("Nature hath 
made men ... equal . • . . [T]he weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, at least in 
confederacy with others •... "). 
236. See Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 494. 
237. See Olsen, supra note 183, at 1513-15. Professor Olsen traces the stages of the market, 
arguing that in feudal times juridical equality was not assumed; rather, hierarchies were taken for 
granted. With the rise of the free market, the rules which had governed the hierarchy, and had 
also protected those on its lower rungs from the arbitrary will of their superiors, came to be seen 
as impediments to liberty. The assumption of equality was needed to justify the loss of those 
protections. 
238. Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 490-97; see also Monell v. New York City Dept. of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 681 (1978) (noting that the nineteenth-century courts, while eschewing 
imposition of some affirmative duties upon the states, "vigorously enforced the Contract Clause 
against municipalities - an enforcement effort which included various forms of 'positive' relief, 
such as ordering that taxes be levied and collected to discharge federal-court judgments, once a 
constitutional infraction was found"). 
Professor Tribe recently suggested an additional source of, or metaphor for, the conventional 
approach: Newtonian physics. He argues that the Newtonian view lacked an understanding 
(later contributed by relativity theory and other developments in scientific thought) that objects 
do not simply exist in space; they bend and shape it so that space and objects cannot be viewed as 
independent from one another. Likewise, the Newtonian approach to law sees the state as a 
neutral, passive backdrop to human events and fails to recognize that the state, and the judiciary, 
shape the space in which events occur. Tribe, supra note 137, at 6-13. 
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2. Effects on Common Law 
The effects of these philosophical assumptions on the development 
of the common law are readily apparent. The common law, at least in 
its early stages, assumed that we are atomistic beings, motivated by 
self interest, and that it was not its function to impose on us an alien 
morality.239 As Prosser commented, the early common law "had no 
great difficulty in working out restraints upon the commission of af-
firmative acts of harm, but shrank from converting the courts into an 
agency for forcing men to help one another."240 The common law 
paradigm is that a man may sit on a dock smoking his pipe and watch 
another man drown, though he could easily throw him a rope. 241 
Thus the common law's antipathy toward affirmative duties has been 
called "an attitude of rugged, perhaps heartless, individualism."242 
The assumption of parity - that individuals are equally able to fend 
for themselves - made the end result of permitting the pursuit of self 
interest socially acceptable. 
Even accepting as a given that people should not be legally bound 
to help one another, the question remains whether government should 
be legally bound to help its citizens. Two tenets of the conventional 
wisdom come together to provide a negative answer to this question. 
The first tenet is the conventional common law assumption of par-
ity, which the common law often employs even when one of the parties 
to a transaction is the government.243 The second tenet, the deeply 
rooted fear of governmental encroachment on individual freedom, 
leads to the same result as the equation of government with an individ-
ual: theoretically, a severely limited governmental role. "That gov-
ernment is best which governs least."244 Finally, the conclusion that 
government should not intrude is buttressed, in the conventional 
story, by assumptions about when government is or is not governing. 
239. See Ames, supra note 101, at 97-103 (tracing unmoral character of early common law). 
240. w. PROSSER & w. KEETON, supra note 47, § 56, at 373. 
241. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 33, § 314 comment c. 
242. F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 34, § 18.6, at 719. 
243. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 226-27; Bandes, supra note 213, at 282-83. 
244. This quotation is commonly ascribed to Thomas Jefferson. However, according to Ber-
gen Evans' DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 285 (1968) it reflects one strain of thought in Jeffer-
son's First Inaugural Address, but no one has ever been able to find it in Jefferson's writings. 
Thoreau said it in "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience," reprinted in SOCIAL AND PoLmCAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 74, at 282, but in quotation marks and without noting the source. THE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (3d ed. 1979) attributes it to John L. O'Sullivan in his 
introduction to THE UNITED STATES MAGAZINE AND DEMOCRATIC REVIEW (1837). As Evans 
says, the idea was in the air in the nineteenth century. Emerson in his Politics (1844) also said, 
"[T]he less government we have the better." R.W. EMERSON, Politics, in 3 THE COMPLETE 
WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 199, 215 (2d ed. 1979) (1844). 
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The common law-notion that government should do nothing affirma-
tive rests on the perception that government does not act when it pro-
tects certain entitlements in service of the status quo: specifically 
contractual and property rights.245 Thus the philosophical ideal of 
governmental inaction is achieved through the fiction that preserva-
. tion of the status quo is a mere failure to act. In addition, the common 
law's focus on the tangible leads to a failure to recognize that govern-
ment may act, and cause harm, through means other than intentional, 
physical coercion.246 
3. Critique of the Use of Common Law and Philosophical Sources 
I do not wish to argue that the conventional philosophical and 
common law positions are completely without merit. My concern is 
with their influence on conventional thought about the scope of gov-
ernmental duties under the Constitution. In that context, I offer three 
major criticisms of the conventional wisdom's reliance on these 
sources. First, the conventional wisdom presents the individualistic 
view as not merely the predominant, but the only, way of thinking 
about governmental duties, and thereby ignores the insights of coun-
tervailing philosophical and common law strains. Second, it reflex-
ively adopts the assumptions of these sources even though 
constitutional concerns may not be contiguous with those of political 
philosophy or the common law. Third, and most fundamentally, the 
conventional wisdom is based on a set of dualities which are unwork-
able. The difficulty in rebutting the conventional wisdom, which 
posits a duality of negative and positive rights and exalts the former 
over the latter, lies in avoiding acceptance of its terms. Claude Levi-
Strauss captured the difficulty when he said that "in attacking an ill-
founded theory the critic begins by paying it a kind of respect."247 
This leads to an inherent tension in the arguments. As a result, I ar-
gue that the conventional wisdom has adopted a myopic focus on neg-
ative rights to the exclusion of positive rights and portrayed it as the 
only possible focus. But more fundamentally, I argue that the distinc-
tion is unworkable, and cannot bear the weight of the constitutional 
choices courts rely on it to make. 
The first issue, then, is the myopic focus of the conventional wis-
dom on individualism. The philosophical sources on which conven-
tional thought draws, such as Aristotle, Kant, and Hobbes, are 
245. See Cohen, supra note 185, at 21; Dewey & Tufts, supra note 74, at 490-91; Sunstein, 
supra note 70, at 882. 
246. See Macpherson, supra note 137, at 97-117. 
247. CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, TOTEMISM 15 (R. Needham trans. 1963). 
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counterpoised by an alternative philosophic stra1n. Tlie individualistic 
notion that liberty can be defined solely in terms of autonomy, or 
"freedom from ... ,"248 and entails no positive obligations, has always 
existed in tension with more collectivist notions of liberty as the free-
dom to be part of a community, participate in government and pursue 
happiness.249 However strong is the hold of Mill's individualism on 
current thought, few. would argue that in its pure form it is a useful 
model for people who live in a community.250 Political philosophers 
have long argued that it does not reflect the reality of a "community 
that recognizes ... myriad interactions among persons and affirmative 
obligations of support."251 
Likewise, the conventional wisdom about the role of government 
rests on· complacent acceptance of the philosophic notion that govern-
ment causes harm only by its actions, and more specifically, its tangi-
ble, intentional, physical actions. Yet this view is at odds with the 
Platonic, collectivist notion that wrongful inaction, particularly by 
government which is charged with preventing injustice, is as objection-
able as wrongful action. 
Just as conventional thought draws selectively from philosophical 
sources, so it relies on particular common law notions. The common 
law, however, is not monolithic or unchanging. Many of the attitudes 
which led to the charter of negative liberties are identified with the 
early common law. The common law is gradually evolving from a 
"formal and unmoral" state252 toward a more humane concern for the 
protection of the powerless. Recently it has shown greater concern 
with the public interest,253 which has led to increasing acceptance of 
248. J. FEINBERG, supra note 190, at 4. 
249. See I. BERLIN, supra note 174, at 131-71; Donald Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism 
as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 low AL. REv. 401, 458-59 (1986); Weinreb, supra note 223, at 
790-91. 
250. See Weinreb, supra note 223, at 791 n.53 (citing James Stephen's comment that there is 
no significant self-regarding conduct while a community is intact: "The intimate sympathy and 
innumerable bonds of all kinds by which men are united, and the differences of character and 
opinions by which they are distinguished, produce and must for ever produce continual struggles 
between them .... "). 
A more current critique of the individualist perspective has been contributed by feminist 
scholars, who have identified it as a male construct, counterpoised by a female perspective which 
places a higher value on interpersonal relations. Minow's article, Justice Engendered, provides a 
detailed demonstration of the ways in which the male construct becomes the unstated norm. See 
Minow, supra note 37, at 61 n.242 and generally; see also Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on 
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 8 n.16 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist 
Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REv. 617, 618 (1990). 
251. See Weinreb, supra note 223, at 791 n.53 (citing H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETH-
ICS 265 (7th ed. 1907)). 
252. Ames, supra note 101, at 97. 
253. w. PROSSER & w. KEETON, supra note 47, § 3, at 16-17 (5th ed. 1984); 3 F. HARPER, 
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affirmative duties,254 and suspicion toward rules which immunize gov-
ernment misconduct.255 Thus, reliance on the common law involves 
choices: if the Court relies on common law notions which the com-
mon law itself is gradually repudiating, it must justify this choice.256 
The decision to rely on the common law is itself a choice which 
must be justified. The early common law was concerned largely with 
enforcing contract and property rights among individuals; whereas the 
Constitution is concerned largely with delineating the role of govern-
ment in relation to the individuals it governs. This is not to say that 
constitutional interpretation should develop without reference to the 
common law. The point is that constitutional and common law con-
cerns are often not contiguous,257 and therefore common law attitudes 
should not be adopted refiexively.258 That, for example, common law 
did not recognize affirmative duties does not resolve the issue whether 
the Constitution should recognize them. 
In sum, the insights of political philosophy and the common law 
have the power to enrich constitutional discourse, under certain condi-
tions. One condition is that the predominant strain must not be mis-
taken for a single, unanimous voice. Another is that the ultimate test 
of an assumption's worth must be its fidelity to constitutional princi-
ples, not its historical pedigree. 
4. Limits of the Common Law: The Failure To Recognize the 
Unique Role of Government 
The failure of the conventional wisdom to recognize the unique 
role of government in a constitutional system exemplifies the danger of 
a reflexive adoption of common law principles. The common law par-
adigm does not account for the imbalance between the "awesome 
F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 34, § 18.6, at 718-23 (increasing tendency to find special rela· 
tionships requiring affirmative duties; enterprise and strict liability; duty to complete a rescue). 
254. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 584, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862, 293 
N.Y.S.2d 897, 900 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting). 
255. See, e.g., Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982); Schear v. Board of County 
Commrs., 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984). 
256. In response it might be argued that the relevant common law for constitutional pur· 
poses is the body of law which existed at the time of the Framers. See supra discussion at text 
accompanying notes 203-10. 
257. See Whitman, supra note 105. 
258. The belief that the Constitution is contiguous with the common law is reminiscent of 
the attitude which historians argue prevailed among the Framers and through the Lochner era, 
that the Constitution, like common law, was based on natural law. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 
64-68 (1989); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1127, 
1130-35 (1987). 
August 1990] Negative Constitution 2321 
power"259 of the government and the lesser power of the individual.260 
In addition, although the individual has an autonomy interest in being 
free from coercion, it makes no sense to ascribe a similar interest to the 
government.261 Nevertheless, the common law tends to treat individ-
ual and government interchangeably when inveighing against affirma-
tive rights.262 
It should be evident that government does not act like an individ-
ual, and is not on an equal footing with individuals. It is self-perpetu-
ating, it possesses massed power263 and resources, it is stratified, and it 
speaks through numerous individuals, not with one voice. 
These characteristics of government define the ways in which gov-
ernment can cause harm. Government harms are different from .and 
in many respects more serious than individually caused harms, and 
these differences have important ramifications for the theory of posi-
tive and negative rights. 
Government creates individual dependency on its services and re-
sources. For example, it has asserted monopoly power to protect from 
crime and to enforce the laws.264 It has the power to tax and to decide 
how tax dollars are spent.265 It has monopoly control over access to 
certain resources, such as highways, legal proceedings, and govern-
ment information.266 It has displaced private alternatives and re-
quired or encouraged reliance on its own regulatory structure in 
259. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
260. Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1987). 
261. Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Affirmative Duty and Constitutional Tort, 16 U. 
MICH. J.L. REP. 1, 4 (1982); see also Bandes, supra note 260, at 1026. But see Epstein, supra note 
186, at 212. 
262. Whitman, supra note 105, at 226; Bandes, supra note 213, at 282-83. 
263. Whitman, supra note 105, at 253. 
264. Government has a monopoly on "legitimate violence." Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1451. 
In addition, the Court has repeatedly held that government has the sole interest in seeing that 
laws are enforced. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
This monopoly power is sometimes said to arise from the terms of the social contract under 
which citizens surrendered some natural rights to society in return for some protections. See 
SOCIAL CONTRACT: EssAYS BY LoCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU (E. Barker ed. 1960). The so-
cial contract theory has given rise to arguments that the government owes its citizens a duty of 
protection. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibil-
ity and the Right Not to Be a Victim, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 63, 75-77 (1984). 
265. A series of Supreme Court decisions have established that individuals have virtually no 
standing to challenge the tax expenditures of federal government. See, e.g., Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 
(1982); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 
(1968). 
266. See, e.g., U.S. Data on Abortion Censored, House Unit Says, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1989, 
at A20, col. 4. 
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numerous areas,267 including licensing of professionals, inspection of 
buildings, food and drugs, and supervision of child welfare. In short, 
it has stripped citizens of self-help remedies in numerous areas. 
Government exerts substantial control over the distribution of 
scarce resources. These include natural resources such as timber and 
water, but also resources like government benefits26B and wealth.269 
With the control of wealth comes power over availability of jobs, the 
price of commodities and access to goods and services. Government 
can harm simply by withholding these resources. 
Government's status as a major employer illustrates another way 
in which it differs from individuals. Even when government acts as a 
private individual, as landlord, employer, owner of hospitals or rail-
roads, it does so on a much grander scale. Its decisions on the training 
and discipline of its employees affect not only its vast work force, but 
the untold numbers of people with whom it comes into contact. Its 
tremendous wealth and power enable it to place conditions on access 
to its holdings which few individuals could approximate, and to cause 
great hardship by its refusal of access. 270 
In light of state action requirements, government is the only entity 
that can violate the Constitution.271 Action which is taken under 
color of law is more serious than a tort committed by an individual, 
because it is an abuse of power possessed by virtue of state author-
ity. 272 The opportunity for abuse is greatly exacerbated by the fact 
that governmental harm often occurs on a systemic basis. 273 
Government, unlike an individual, is a bureaucracy.274 This obvi-
ous fact is important in several respects. Government decisions are 
267. See generally Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administratil'e Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975). 
268. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1295-97. 
269. PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS, EcONOMICS 47, 568-69 (12th ed. 1985). 
270. The government's freedom to place conditions is, of course, restricted to some extent by 
the Constitution. See discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, supra note 18, supra 
notes 159-67. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593 (1972); LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 10-9, at 686. Once government 
has decided to distribute largess, it may not destroy entitlement without due process. 
271. See supra text accompanying note 71. However, Congress has some power to regulate 
private conduct, such as conspiracy, which interferes with the exercise of fourteenth amendment 
rights. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
272. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 254-58 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). One example 
of the dissonance between tort and constitutional concerns is the question of remedy. The tort 
model sees money damages as sufficient compensation for its wrongs. This conclusion does not 
necessarily hold true under the Constitution, which treats some harms as unacceptable, whether 
or not after-the-fact damages are available. See Whitman, supra note 105, at 226. 
273. See Bandes, supra note 105, at 125-27; Bandes, supra note 213, at 310. 
274. See generally P. SCHUCK, supra note 65; M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: 
DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980). 
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made by a series of individuals, sometimes in different branches. 275 
Government is stratified, creating classes of supervisors and subordi-
nates. The natural disincentives to act which exist in bureaucracies 
exist in government as well. Finally, governmental choices, however 
harmful, are more often made by the interaction of several people act-
ing in good faith than by a single malevolent person, and they are, 
therefore, more likely to cause intangible harm than direct physical 
damage. 
The analogy between individual and government harm is not only 
flawed, but pernicious. When government is treated as an individual, 
the many ways in which it can cause harm are overlooked because 
they do not neatly fit common law conceptions which focus on equally 
placed individuals who. cause or suffer tangible physical harms. 276 
5. The Unhelpful Distinction Between Positive and Negative Rights 
The more fundamental issue is the unworkable nature of the philo-
sophical distinctions: their inability to assist in determining what the 
duties of government ought to be. Ultimately, the distinctions cannot 
work because positive and negative rights, like action and inaction, or 
state action and private action, are concepts which cannot be distin-
guished without a reference point, or a theory of values. In them-
selves, they tell us little which will assist in making difficult choices 
about the role of government. 
Negative liberty, as Mill and Berlin saw it, was easily defined and 
applied. By limiting the role of government to safeguarding our right 
to be left alone, it avoided the complex value judgments about individ-
ual motivations and governmental duties which a theory of positive 
liberty would require.277 However, the ease of application is based on 
a number of restrictive and ultimately untenable assumptions about 
individuals and government. 
At its most restrictive, the concept of negative liberty is based on a 
Hobbesian notion of each person as an atomistic body, which goes on 
moving until physically impeded by the impact of another body.278 
Even in this view, government is needed to safeguard freedom from 
physical intrusion. If liberty means more than a life of constant fear of 
275. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
276. See discussion of the DeShaney Court's treatment of the custody issue, supra text ac-
companying notes 116-38. 
277. I. BERLIN, supra note 174, at 132-70; Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Lib-
erty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 179, 187 (A. Ryan ed. 1979). 
278. See T. HOBBES, supra note 235, at 88; Taylor, supra note 277, at 183; C. MACPHERSON, 
supra note 137, at 104; see also Tribe, supra note 137, at 7, calling this a Newtonian view. 
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physical harm in which only the strongest survive, some laws are nec-
essary, and they will infringe on freedom to some degree.279 It then 
becomes necessary to determine which physical intrusions will be per-
mitted, 280 and whose freedom of movement will be protected at the 
expense of that of others. 
The Hobbesian view is thus unsuccessful even on its own terms as 
a way to avoid value judgments about the role of government. But in 
any case its view of people as an atomistic beings who impinge on 
others' freedom only through physical coercion is crude and reduc-
tionist. Many commentators have noted that in modem society, in 
which we live together in a complex web of interdependencies, virtu-
ally any act has repercussions on others and impinges on their 
freedom.281 
If A wishes to visit a beautiful valley, her freedom to do so, or at 
least to do so in solitude, may be impeded by B's physical presence in 
the valley, or even by B's threats of physical force. But her freedom 
will be more effectively impeded by B's ownership of the valley. This 
latter impediment derives its efficacy from the force of law, which en-
ables B to exclude others and restrict their freedom of movement and 
access.282 In the Hobbesian view, A is coerced only in the former in-
stance, yet her loss of freedom is the same in each, and in the second 
instance it is attributable, not only to an individual, but to an act of 
government. 
In the conventional view, the government's act to protect property 
and certain other well-established entitlements through its laws is not 
coercive, and in fact is not an act at all.283 The ownership of property 
is afait accomp/i, and government would act only if it tried to interfere 
with it. This conception is traceable to the Aristotelian approach to 
justice described by Professor Shklar, in which there must be "primary 
rules settling what is due to whom, [and] there must be effective insti-
tutions to maintain the rules in the course of private exchanges and to 
punish violations. When these norms are not followed there is injus-
tice, and that is all that can be said about it."284 
Once everything is distributed, government's only duty is to main-
279. c. MACPHERSON, supra note 137, at 117. 
280. Mill, for example, was troubled by the hypothetical case of a man about to walk un-
knowingly off a bridge, and questioned whether it would be permissible to grab him to prevent 
him from drowning. See Weinreb, supra note 223, at 791 n.53 (1984) (citing I. MILL, supra note 
223, at 17). 
281. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 38, at 995-97; Weinreb, supra note 223, at 790. 
282. See Cohen, supra note 185, at 11-12. 
283. Sunstein, supra note 70, at 886-88. 
284. Shklar, supra note 219, at 1137. 
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tain the status quo. When it does so, its role is perceived as passive 
and noninterfering, and therefore consistent with the ideal of negative 
liberty. Negative liberty, once again, is an ideal because it leaves peo-
ple free to pursue their own ends and because it keeps government out 
of the realm of value choices. Yet it becomes obvious that those goals 
cannot be achieved. 
The initial distribution of goods and property was done according 
to a value system which may or may not have been fair. The decision 
to enforce the status quo, freezing the effects of the initial distribution, 
is a value choice. As Morris Cohen forcefully argued sixty years ago, 
the assumption that each person is entitled to keep his "own" property 
is only one of many possible principles of distribution. Moreover, it is 
not necessarily consistent with negative liberty's ideal of maximizing 
self-regarding conduct, since few people are solely responsible for ac-
cumulating their own wealth.285 Finally, in protecting the initial dis-
tribution, government is complicit in excluding others and thereby 
impinging on their freedom of access. Its actions, in short, are based 
on value choices about whose freedom it will protect and whose it will 
obstruct. 
In the conventional view, the concept of negative liberty is easy to 
apply because it forbids only external (other-imposed) constraints; 
whereas positive freedom also includes liberty from internal (self-im-
posed) constraints.286 That is, if government were responsible for en-
suring that people were not internally constrained, it would have to 
make dangerous determinations about whether they were acting in 
their own best interests. If government need only ensure that it does 
not obstruct them, it can do so simply by doing nothing. 
In fact, whether a constraint originates with government or with 
the individual depends on where one draws the boundary between the 
two.287 For example, although Berlin conceived of lack of education 
as an internally imposed constraint, pervasive government regulation 
and provision of education render this conclusion anachronistic.288 If 
it was until recently nearly impossible to gain legally recognized un-
restricted access to land in Hawaii, it was because government has 
285. Cohen, supra note 185, at 15. 
286. I. BERLIN, supra note 174. 
287. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 190, at 5-7; Thomas Morawetz, Persons Without History: 
Liberal Theory and Human Experience, 66 B.U. L. REv. 1013, 1032 (1986); Weinreb, supra note 
223, at 792-93. 
288. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down state law which barred illegal 
aliens from attending public schools); San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973) (sustaining school finance scheme based on property tax despite disparate impact on poor 
districts). 
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long protected the entitlements of the few at the expense of the 
many,289 not because the distribution was natural, just or efficient. If 
after Webster many Missouri women cannot obtain abortions because 
the government has deprived their doctors of access to public hospitals 
as well as to many private ones, it is because the Court has approved 
the state's determination that this constraint on access to medical care 
may be externally imposed. Much hinges on how the natural order is 
defined. 
The question, unavoidably, is what functions ought to be external 
to government and what functions it ought to perform. Mechanistic 
formulae about what is positive or negative, what is internal or exter-
nal, allow a pretense that this question need not be faced. It is a pre-
tense, because in the end, the formulae are empty. They have no 
descriptive force, since the reality is much too complex to fit within 
polar categories. The formulae are said to be devoid of normative 
force: they are billed as an alternative to value choices. Thus 
although they rest on a series of value choices - to condemn only 
physical or tangible interference; to prefer the status quo; to protect 
certain entitlements while leaving the means for satisfying others to 
the vagaries of the open market - they do not justify them. In short, 
they fail to describe the way things are or the way things should be. It 
is a puzzle that our jurisprudence vests them with such power. 
C. The Fear of Chaos: Floodgates, Slippery Slopes, 
and Judicial Incapacity 
My focus thus far has been on the historical antecedents which 
have informed and misinformed constitutional thinking about affirma-
tive and negative duties. In this final section I explore another set of 
tenaciously held beliefs which prevents clear thinking about the scope 
of governmental duties. 290 Broadly speaking, these arguments rest on 
a common belief that once the courts recognized any affirmative du-
ties, they would lose control and chaos would reign. To state the con-
verse, the arguments begin from the assumption that by recognizing 
only the negative governmental duty to avoid direct harm, courts 
avoid the need for difficult decisions about motivation, causation, 
duty, allocation of governmental resources, allocation of judicial re-
sources and a host of other thorny issues. Although the arguments 
overlap, I consider three variations on the general theme that recogni-
tion of affirmative rights would lead to chaos. First, the floodgates and 
289. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984). 
290. These beliefs also rest to a great degree on common law and other historical assump-
tions, as I will discuss throughout this part. 
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institutional competence arguments: recognition of affirmative duties 
would drain scarce resources and burden the courts with nonjudicial 
tasks. Second, the slippery slope argument: recognition of limited af-
firmative duties would inexorably lead to unwieldy, unenforceable and 
undesirable duties as well. Finally, the difficulty of application argu-
ment: affirmative duties destroy the convenient, containable and en-
forceable pairing of rights and duties and raise difficult questions about 
causation, motivation and enforcement. 
1. The Floodgates and Institutional Competence Arguments 
The floodgates argument, in its crudest form, expresses the fear 
that if we allow this case, too many others like it will arise. It is often 
paired with a more sophisticated institutional competence argument, 
which is an objection not merely to the number of ·cases, but to the 
legitimacy of judicial involvement in any cases of this type. 
The nature of this objection to imposing governmental duties is 
that once a court has held that government has failed to perform some 
duty, for example that the police have failed to protect a citizen from a 
threat of violence or the fire department has sat idly by and watched a 
building burn to the ground, the court will become mired in questions 
about how each government employee should do her job, will have to 
allocate the resources of the various governmental agencies, and will 
virtually usurp the function of the agencies themselves.291 Thus the 
court may be doing something inherently undesirable,292 which, to 
make matters worse, will dominate the court's docket and crowd out 
meritorious claims. Consider the following representative language: 
Should a Court . . . be empowered to evaluate . . . the handling of a 
major fire and determine whether the hoses were properly placed and the 
firemen correctly allocated? Might a Court also properly entertain a tort 
claim over a school teacher's ability to teach seventh grade English or 
over a postman's failure to deliver promptly an important piece of mail? 
Having raised the specter of unlimited judicial duties, the court de-
scribed the feared consequences: 
The creation of direct, personal accountability between ea~h government 
employee and every member of the community would effectively bring 
the business of government to a speedy halt, "would dampen the ardor 
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible in the unflinching 
discharge of their duties," and dispatch a new generation of litigants to 
291. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223-24 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1447 (7th Cir. 1984). 
292. Thus, although the argument obviously has a slippery slope aspect to it, it does not 
make the "implicit concession" which, according to Professor Schauer, is the requisite of the 
slippery slope: that in the instant case, as opposed to the danger case, the result would be cor-
rect. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361, 368-69 (1985). 
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the courthouse over grievances real and imagined. An enormous 
amount of public time and money would be consumed ... [and] prudent 
public employees would choose to leave public service.293 
Courts and legislatures have long found ways to prevent this ac-
countability from coming to pass. One of the most effective ways has 
been sovereign immunity. In the tort context, even where sovereign 
immunity has waned, claims that government has failed to provide 
services in a nonnegligent manner often founder on the public duty 
rule, which states that the duty owed by government is to the public at 
large, and is unenforceable by individuals.294 Although some courts 
have rejected the public duty rule as a back door form of sovereign 
immunity,295 it lives on.296 
The stated rationale for this rule is that the question of how a gov-
ernment will allocate its resources is political, and must be left to the 
discretion of elected officials.297 This rationale is mirrored in constitu-
tional law. The assumption behind the public duty rule, that a duty 
owed to many should be enforceable only at the polls, not through the 
courts, is a familiar tenet of the doctrines of generalized grievance and 
political question. 298 With a gloss of federalism, the assumption has 
been used to explain why federal courts should not require state gov-
ernment to provide competent services. 299 
There is an inherent ambiguity in the floodgates argument between 
the notion that every enforced public duty is undesirable, and the no-
tion that the undesirability comes from the sheer number of such 
cases. To the extent the objection is to sheer numbers, it falls of its 
own weight. 300 It amounts to the crudest defense of the status quo: 
meritorious cases must be turned away because the courts are busy 
with other cases. The argument fails because it skirts examination of 
293. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 9 (D.C. 1981) (en bane). This case rejects 
a claim based on tort, not the Constitution. However, its language and concerns are representa· 
tive of those in cases rejecting constitutional claims that government failed to provide adequate 
services. See, e.g., Archie, 847 F.2d at 1224. 
294. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 
(1968). 
295. See, e.g., Schear v. Board of County Commrs., 101 N.M. 671, 673 (1984); Riss, 240 
N.E.2d at 866 (Keating, J., dissenting). 
296. See Riss, 240 N.E.2d 860; Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981) (en 
bane). 
297. Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 861; Wells & Eaton, supra note 261, at 5. 
298. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. 
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
299. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d at 1224; Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 
109 S. Ct. 3040, 3053 (1989) (decision to prohibit abortion subject to public debate and approval 
or disapproval at the polls). · 
300. I have made very similar arguments against the bar to granting standing in generalized 
grievance cases. See Bandes, supra note 213, at 285-86. 
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the nature of those other cases and determination of docket priorities. 
The argument is crude for another reason: it erroneously assumes that 
the status quo includes no cases in which government breached a duty 
to its citizens. Courts inevitably review government practices which 
injure citizens; the question is whether they are excluding the most 
important ones. 301 
The more sophisticated, judicial competence, tenet of the argument 
holds that the idea of judicially enforced public duty is in itself unde-
sirable. The myriad decisions by governmental officials and entities 
not to provide services should not be reviewed by the judiciary. Once 
the courts hold that government failed to exercise a duty, they will be 
in the business of running the government. Any breach by the govern-
ment of its duties to provide services can be corrected by the political 
branches. 
This argument assumes that by avoiding recognition of affirmative 
duties, the court is kept out of the political realm. On the contrary, 
the decision not to consider whether a duty has been breached is a 
decision to defer to, and ratify, the political choices government 
makes. Whether that ratification is correct is unavoidably a judicial 
question. As Chief Justice Marshall made clear in Marbury v. 
Madison, 302 the courts will not interfere with the discretion of the 
political branches, but they must determine whether those branches 
are transgressing the rights of individuals. Thus whether a govern-
mental decision is discretionary or violative of protected rights is a 
judicial question. 303 
Professor Lucinda Finley made this point forcefully in the context 
of police response to domestic violence. As she noted, many of the 
public duty cases, including the notorious Riss v. City of New York, 304 
turned away claims by women that police failure to respond to their 
requests for protection from threats of domestic violence led to their 
grievous injury. The court's response that it could not force police 
departments to change their priorities begged the precise question 
raised: whether those priorities.should be judicially ratified.305 Even-
301. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d at 588-90, 240 N.E.2d at 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 
903-05 (Keating, J., dissenting). 
302. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
303. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980) ("[A] municipality has no 
'discretion' to violate the Federal Constitution; its dictates are absolute and imperative."); see 
also Bandes, supra note 213, at 277-79; Davis, supra note 62, at 706 (discretion should not be 
eliminated, but unnecessary discretion should); Miller supra note 20, at 225-28 (discussing indi-
vidual duties, government duties and duty of the court as national conscience). 
304. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). 
305. Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 
1 YALE J.L. & FEM. 41, 71-72 (1989). 
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tually, courts began to recognize constitutional infirmities in police de-
partment priorities, and to award damages for violation of individual 
rights.306 
The solicitude for discretion leads to insulation of government 
practices, policies, and choices from meaningful constitutional scru-
tiny, unless they fit the conventional description of direct and tangible 
harm. 307 This is a normative choice about the role of the court and 
the political branches. It says that the judicial role is to defer to gov-
ernmental inaction, and thus it is a choice in favor of inaction. Given 
the nature of government, the choice is dangerous: it reinforces incen-
tives which are already skewed against supervisory control over gov-
ernment employees, and encourages the unbridled discretion which 
leads to unconstitutional conduct. 308 
2. The Slippery Slope Argument 
Fear of the slippery slope is perhaps the most tenacious barrier to 
the recognition of affirmative duties. Every critic of affirmative duties 
invokes the slippery slope. In the philosophical realm, Berlin rejected 
the notion of positive governmental duties because of the specter of 
totalitarianism: once we begin allowing government to do anything 
but leave us alone, we will end with it coercing us to obey its idea of 
freedom. 309 In the constitutional realm, the argument is that once we 
306. Id. at 72 (discussing Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) 
(equal protection violated when police treat domestic violence differently, and less seriously, than 
other types of crime)). 
307. See Sunstein, supra note 70, at 918 (to leave governmental decisions to political determi-
nation spells an end to constitutionalism). An additional and complex issue is raised. Even if 
government agencies should be subject to judicial oversight to ensure that they discharge their 
duties, that oversight arguably can be achieved through state tort law rather than under the 
Constitution. One might argue, for example, that enforcement of affirmative duties is a tort 
function, whereas the sole constitutional function is to ensure that government discharges its 
negative duty to cause no harm. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1215-19 (7th 
Cir. 1988). Although I do not wish to minimize the complexity of the federalism issues involved, 
it seems to me that this formulation is essentially the conventional wisdom in sophisticated garb. 
Once the distinction between affirmative and negative duties is seen as an untenable means of 
defining constitutional protection, the important issue becomes simply what duties the Constitu-
tion mandates. If a governmental duty is mandated under the Constitution, judicial review of the 
exercise of that duty is appropriate. The fact that the same duty might be mandated under state 
tort law neither detracts from the existence of the constitutional duty nor renders judicial review 
of its discharge any less appropriate. The distinction between the scope of tort protection and 
that of constitutional protection, so often invoked to restrict constitutional duties, also works to 
ensure that they are not unduly limited by the scope of tort law. See supra text accompanying 
notes 259-76. 
308. Davis, supra note 62, at 722; P. SCHUCK, supra note 65. Of course, government discre-
tion can be controlled in numerous ways. Professor Davis suggests, in the context of police 
departments, that administrative or legislative controls are the solution of choice, and that the 
judiciary should step in only in the absence of action by the political branches. Davis, supra note 
62, at 724. 
309. I. BERLIN, supra note 174, at 131; C. MACPHERSON, supra note 183, at 105-16. 
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hold that due process requires the government to perform a statutorily 
mandated duty to protect a known individual from threatened harm, 
we will next be forcing cities to create police and fire departments and 
will ultimately be guaranteeing every person a living wage and enough 
to eat.310 In the tort context, a duty of easy rescue is rejected because 
it would lead to forcing the wealthy to support the poor.311 The dis-
cussion of the moral or legal advisability of narrowly phrased duties, 
such as the duty of a person on shore to throw a drowning child a life 
preserver, invariably turns to Macaulay's hypothetical question of 
whether the surgeon who refuses to go from Calcutta to Meerut to 
perform a necessary operation only he can perform should be obli-
gated to do so.312 
The question arises: why must we end up talking about doctors 
traveling through India? This ubiquitous hypothetical is emblematic 
of the slippery slope argument. The argument is that if we require 
only that each person be left to her own devices and not obligated to 
assist others, we need never venture into the moral thicket of motiva-
tions, morals and values. Once we say that people may sometimes 
have a duty to help others, even if the inconvenience is slight and the 
benefit is vast, we have intruded on personal autonomy. That is, we 
have enforced beneficence at the expense of individual determination, 
and thus introduced the principle which will lead to forced charity or 
dangerous rescue though it causes great personal hardship.3 13 
Whether or not this is so, its connection to governmental duties is 
not immediately obvious. Government has no liberty or autonomy in-
terests akin to those of individuals,314 a distinction which the private 
law focus of much of negative rights theory tends to obscure.315 Nev-
ertheless, the slippery slope argument takes a similar form when the 
310. See, for example, Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1986), which 
rejected a claim on behalf of a woman murdered after government officials ignored threats 
against her by a mentally ill inmate and released him without notifying her. The court spoke of 
the enormous economic consequences which would follow from the reading of the fourteenth 
amendment urged by the plaintiff, which would permit myriad errors by state officials to be 
found violative of the Constitution. 787 F.2d at 722-23; see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353, 362 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (result could lead to affirmative duties to lift handicaps 
flowing from differences in economic circumstances); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980) 
(same); Robert Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 
WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 699 (if a claimant can demand broadening of a welfare program, he can 
demand it be started from scratch). 
311. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 61-68. But see Weinreb, supra note 41, at 272-73 
(arguing that Epstein's analysis is flawed, and that a duty of easy rescue does not necessarily lead 
to a general duty of charity). 
312. See, e.g., Ames, supra note 101, at 112. 
313. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 6-63. 
314. Weinrib, supra note 41, at 278. 
315. Singer, supra note 38, at 982. 
2332 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:2271 
government's duties are at issue. Berlin's argument against positive 
rights, which is concerned specifically with the role of government, is 
the seminal slippery slope argument in the philosophical context. The 
argument assumes that as long as government's only duty is to leave 
its citizens to their own devices, the moral thicket may be avoided. 
Once government begins helping people it must make value determi-
nations about the kind of help they need, and must judge the validity 
of their motivations.316 This introduces the principle which will lead 
to a totalitarian society which seeks to dictate a particular view of 
freedom to unwilling citizens. 
The slippery slope argument as it appears in constitutional dis-
course is not well articulated, and yet it is presented as decisive.317 
The argument is that the duty of government is to avoid coercing citi-
zens and to ensure that they do not coerce each other. Once it is held 
that government must provide a service competently, or ensure access 
to that service, it becomes a partner in coercion. In Judge Posner's 
words: "To adopt these proposals [to guarantee certain services] 
would change [the due process clause] from a protection against coer-
cion . . . to a command that the state use its taxing power to coerce 
some of its citizens to provide services to others."318 This is a classic 
slippery slope argument because it spends little time considering the 
actual governmental duty proposed. The proposed duty, as in 
DeShaney, is usually narrowly defined, and would obligate an existing 
public agency to perform a specific (and often, already promised or 
statutorily mandated) action on behalf of an identified individual or 
class. Yet the court resolves the issue by raising the specter of 
mandatory provision of goods and services.319 The assumption is that 
as long as the Constitution has nothing to say about how or whether 
goods and services are provided, it has maintained a neutral stance on 
the difficult moral issue of their distribution. 
In sum, the slippery slope argument is that by avoiding imposition 
of any affirmative duties, the judiciary can also avoid value judgments. 
The argument is thus fatally flawed because it fails to see the implicit 
316. See Taylor, supra note 277, at 179-81. 
317. As Professor Schauer puts it, "Where do you draw the line?" is regarded as a "knock-
down argument." Schauer, supra note 292, at 380. 
318. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1049 (1984). Similar arguments are made in the equal protection context. For example, Justice 
Harlan's famous dissents in the Griffin-Douglas cases speak of the danger of using the equal 
protection clause to "eliminate the evils of poverty." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
319. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d at 1221; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at 
362 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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value choices on which it rests and the impossibility of avoiding the 
question of values. 
The slippery slope argument assumes that the parade of horribles 
(legislated morality, forced redistribution of wealth, totalitarianism) 
can be held at bay by a purely mechanical conception of liberty as the 
right to be left alone by each other and by government. As Professor 
Charles Taylor described it, this conception "has no place for the no-
tion of significance"; it presents itself as "purely quantitative."320 It 
tries to avoid value judgments about which interests government will 
protect by positing government's role as completely passive. Yet this 
in itself is a value choice in favor of individual autonomy and the sta-
tus quo as the highest values. In addition, it is unworkable even on its 
own terms. As discussed earlier, no liberty or autonomy is possible 
without some protection from coercion, and no society can function in 
which each person is completely free to define and practice his or her 
own version of liberty. Thus the courts must enforce value choices 
about which interests deserve protection and which must be sacrificed; 
they must give some content to the notion of protectable liberty.321 
If the courts cannot stay off the slippery slope entirely, how can 
chaos be avoided? To consider this question, it is helpful to examine 
the slippery slope methodology. The classic argument is that a certain 
result in the case at hand would not be troublesome, but it should be 
rejected because it would inevitably lead to bad results Ui future cases. 
That is, there is no principled way to draw the line. 322 As Professor 
Schauer points out, the slippery slope argument contains an implicit 
concession that the result would be acceptable in the instant case, but 
blocks the result for fear of its application in the danger case. 323 
Though the instant case might be easily resolved, the slippery slope 
methodology is to search for a universal rule which would also resolve 
every difficult case, naturally fail to find one, and therefore decline the 
acceptable solution to the instant case. 
In the DeShaney case, for example, it would have been consistent 
with due process for the Court to construct a narrow holding that the 
state had abused its power by failing to provide statutorily required 
services to the plaintiff when it had promised to do so, had notice of 
his life threatening situation and had indeed contributed to that situa-
tion when it returned him to his violent home. The Court never really 
explained why this result was unacceptable; it simply refused to ven-
320. Taylor, supra note 277, at 183. 
321. See infra text accompanying notes 366-91. 
322. Schauer, supra note 292, at 368-70. 
323. Id. 
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ture from the well-defined confines of its custody exception onto the 
slippery slope of requiring government services. 324 The result was to 
ratify a conception of liberty which did not include a minor's right to 
protection from anticipated physical injury. Likewise, in the abortion 
funding cases, the Court could have held that funding for a constitu-
tionally protected medical procedure like abortion cannot be with-
drawn in the context of a program which subsidizes all other 
medically necessary procedures. The Court's refusal to do so was 
based in large part on its fear of the danger case: forced funding of 
abortions in the absence of any other subsidized medical care.325 The 
result was to exclude from the definition of liberty the right of access 
to constitutionally protected, medically necessary services. 
In a sense the slippery slope is the mirror image of the Court's 
baseline methodology. When determining whether the government 
has caused a worsening in the plaintiff's position, the Court uses a 
complete lack of government services as its point of comparison. 
When determining whether it should remedy the plaintiff's harm, the 
Court posits a full complement of constitutionally required govern-
ment services as the inevitable outcome. Neither a lack of services nor 
required subsistence accurately describes the current world.326 Yet 
the Court moves immediately to the decontextualized abstraction to 
decide the actual case. 
The alternative would be to decide the case before it by determin-
ing what particular justice the Constitution demands. The facility to 
do this, and to draw lines between the case before it and all the cases 
not before it, is the most important role of a court and an important 
way in which it differs from a legislature. The paradox is that by re-
fusing to draw the line, the Court does so anyway. In DeShaney, it 
drew the line at physical custody, proving that it can be drawn, but 
failing to discuss whether it was drawn in the right place. More gener-
ally, in drawing the line at government inaction, the Court ensures 
that government will do nothing to redress entrenched barriers to ac-
324. See infra text accompanying notes 366-91. 
325. See, e.g., Harris, 448 U.S. at 318. 
326. However, a full complement of government services is a much more accurate descrip· 
tion of current conditions in the United States than is a complete lack of such services. In truth, 
the courts' horror at the idea of required police and fire protection seems somewhat anachronis-
tic. It has been argued that government protection from harm is an essential part of the social 
contract under which citizens give up their right to protect themselves. See, e.g., Edelman, supra 
note 205, at 21. An argument could also be made that in the wake of the Civil War amendments, 
certain minimum expectations about government protection of safety and welfare have been 
shifted to the federal government and that access to such protection should not fluctuate based 
on locality. Increasingly since the 1930s, these expectations have been fulfilled. Whether or not 
the argument for required services could be made successfully, the threat that affirmative govern-
mental duties would lead to forced police and fire protection does not seem particularly alarming. 
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cess but will instead continue to protect the inj~stice'S inherent in the 
current order. 
In short, for fear of the wrong result later, the Court -chooses the 
wrong result now, based on the mistaken belief that by preserving the 
status quo it has not acted; that by choosing a rough form of justice it 
has avoided the question of justice entirely. It freezes the law and 
prevents it from taking account of evolving moral, social, and political 
norms, assuming that by excluding these forces it has safeguarded its 
fixed certainty.327 In truth, only half the goal is achieved. The law is 
fixed, but justice is too often sacrificed for want of an abstract rule. 
3. The Reciprocity and Administrative Implementation Arguments 
Proponents of the traditional view frequently argue that it would 
be impracticable to impose affirmative duties. They reason that when 
a negative duty is imposed, it is obvious when it has been breached, 
who caused the breach, who suffered from it, and what the remedy 
should be. If an affirmative duty were imposed, such as the duty to 
protect others from harm, it would not be obvious who owes the duty 
to whom, and thus it would be too difficult to enforce.328 
There are several distinct strands to this argument which bear 
closer examination. First, it would be too difficult to determine who 
has caused a harm which consisted of the breach of an affirmative 
duty.329 Second, it would be too difficult to determine who was re-
sponsible for discharging an affirmative duty. Finally, it would be too 
difficult to enforce an affirmative duty. 
a. Causation. Turning first to the causation issue, 330 the argu-
ment is sometimes made that, as a semantic matter, one does not cause 
harm through an omission in the same way one causes harm through 
an act.331 Alternatively, it is argued that although one might cause 
harm through an omission, the causal connection is more difficult to 
prove.332 
327. See ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 
182 (1982). Professor Summers argues that when judges believe they have no authority to "make 
law" they are unwilling to extend a doctrine to the full extent of its moral implications or change 
it in response to moral criticism. "They have viewed the law as something to be nailed down ... 
rather than as something that could be in [the] process of evolution." Id. 
328. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 186, at 208-17. 
329. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 51-53. 
330. It is beyond the scope and expertise of this article to attempt a full consideration of the 
complex issues of causation, on which Professor Epstein, among others, has writterl extensively. 
See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43; Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 
391 (1975). 
331. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 51-53. 
332. In the context of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), for example, the Court has 
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Concededly, by pushing a nonswimmer into the water one causes a 
harm, in a descriptive sense, that one does not cause by failing to 
throw an already drowning person a rope. The former actor physi-
cally brought about the harm, while the latter made no physical move-
ment which contributed to the harm. As Professor Fletcher describes, 
the early common law of homicide found the distinction significant, 
and "tainted" those who had physically caused death without regard 
to justification or excuse. 333 However, since at least the nineteenth 
century the common law has recognized that one may cause death 
without performing a physical act. 334 Modem criminal law may find a 
harm which the defendant physically caused to be excusable, and may 
find a harm caused by omission to be culpable. Although the notion of 
physical causation still has descriptive force, it is by itself a wholly 
inadequate basis for determining culpability. 
In every area of law, causation is determined through a set of crite-
ria which are designed to assess culpability. Intent, fault, proximate 
cause, and duty, all are legal constructs which seek to determine, from 
all the possible antecedent causes of an injury, which are legally signif-
icant. 335 The law is simply not coherent without some means of affix-
ing blameworthiness, apart from notions of actual cause or but-for 
cause. Thus a concession that cause by action can be distinguished 
from cause by omission, or even that the former is easier to demon-
strate than the latter, would not resolve the issue of whether omissions 
should be actionable. As to both acts and omissions, the law must 
make difficult policy determinations about which causes require the 
assessment of fault. 336 Difficulty of proof is simply one element in the 
calculus. 
In addition, it would be incorrect to concede a significant distinc-
tion between causation by acts and omissions. First, the distinction 
created more stringent requirements for proof of omissions than for proof of acts. For example, 
in City of Canton v. Harris, it held that to establish municipal liability for a policy of failure to 
train, the plaintiff must show a heightened state of mind: deliberate indifference, though no such 
requirement exists for proof of "direct" acts. The Court justifies the heightened requirement by 
reference to the difficulty of proving causation where an omission is alleged. 109 S. Ct. 1197, 
1204-07 (1989); see also Michael Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns 
and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 610 (1989) (defending 
heightened state of mind requirement); Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to be Subjected": The 
Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1225-26 
(1988) (criticizing court for confusing proof of policy with causation). 
333. G. FLETCHER, supra note 39, § 5.1.1-5.1.2, at 343-50. 
334. Id. at § 8.2.2, at 594 (citing Regina v. Instan, 1 Q.B. 450 (1893), which upheld a man-
slaughter conviction against a woman for letting her aged aunt die). 
335. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Sig-
nificance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REv. 82, 93-96 (1989). 
336. See, e.g., Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 351-55, 162 N.E. 99, 103-05 
(1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
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will hinge on the way the activity in question is defined. In the tort 
context, failure to apply brakes in a moving vehicle, or to remove a 
sponge from a patient at the end of an operation, are considered negli-
. gent acts, not omissions. This is because they are part of an ongoing 
activity.337 In the constitutional context, all wrongful acts of govern-
ment must be evaluated in light of government's ongoing nature and 
ability to cause harm by its inaction. 
Second, omissions cause harm when they give rise to the breach of 
a duty to act.338 A court may find that a parent caused the death of a 
child by failing to feed him, but that thirty-eight onlookers did not 
cause the death of Kitty Genovese by failing to come to her aid. 339 
The distinction lies in the scope of duty; which must be determined 
from the constitutional, statutory or common law provision which cre-
ates the duty. 
In the constitutional context, it is meaningless to speak of causa-
tion without reference to the scope of particular rights. A violation of 
the sixth amendment is caused by the failure to provide trial counsel to 
an indigent defendant;340 a violation of the fourteenth amendment is 
caused by a failure to provide an indigent defendant a free trial tran-
script at the appellate level. 341 Did the failure of DSS to act compe-
tently cause Joshua DeShaney's injuries? The question can be 
answered only by determining the scope of its duty under the due pro-
cess clause. In a legal as opposed to a semantic context, the question 
of causation hinges on rights, relationships and duties: causation does 
not exist in a vacuum. 
b. Responsibility. A closely related argument against liability for 
omissions is that it would be difficult to determine who was obligated 
to compensate for the harm. In this vein, Professor Epstein argues 
against affirmative duties because they would not be reciprocal. As he 
describes it, the clarity of a negative duty comes from its reciprocal 
nature. The reciprocal nature of negative duties is obvious: A refrains 
from harming B and B refrains from harming A. A knows the identity 
of the person to whom he owes a duty, and to whom he will be liable if 
he breaches it. However, when a duty is positive in nature, such as the 
duty to protect others from harm, the reciprocity is lost, since there is . 
"no single obvious neighbor, who must satisfy any particular person's 
337. G. FLETCHER, supra note 39, § 8.2, at 586-88. See text accompanying notes 46-48. 
338. G. FLETCHER, supra note 39, § 8.2, at 586-88. 
339. Id. at § 8.2.3, at 601; § 8.2.4, at 605. 
340. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
341. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
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needs. "342 
One immediate response to this argument is that it assumes a 
choice between perfect reciprocity and duties owed to the world at 
large. It is possible to construct a duty which is owed to a discrete and 
identifiable group of people. The difficulties in determining who 
should be liable would be merely administrative, and no different from 
any situation in which there were several tortfeasors. 343 
The more significant objection, in the constitutional realm, is that 
the notion of reciprocity is irrelevant to the question of governmental 
duties.344 First, the duties which flow from individuals to government 
cannot be the same as those which flow the other way. Second, gov-
ernment may be obligated to prevent harm it has not caused. 
The government is an inanimate object; a bureaucracy; an institu-
tion with certain powers. The Constitution gives it enumerated pow-
ers over the citizenry and then forbids it to abuse them. It cannot kill 
its citizens, search them or force them to trial without certain safe-
guards. It makes no sense to speak of reciprocal obligations flowing 
from citizens to government. Citizens have certain obligations to gov-
ernment, such as the duty to pay taxes345 or serve in the military.346 
They are reciprocal only in the sense that both government and citi-
zens have some duties to each other, but the duties are not mirror 
images in Epstein's sense. 
But if reciprocity means only that both government and its citizens 
possess some duties, then it says nothing about whether these duties 
must be negative or may be affirmative. In fact, many of the individ-
ual duties are classically affirmative in nature: paying taxes, risking 
life and limb in defense of country. As social contract theory suggests, 
arguably the government ought to owe some affirmative duties in re-
turn. 347 If the power to tax engenders a correlative right, it is sensible 
that this right is one to services, or at least to a voice in how tax money 
342. Epstein, supra note 186, at 209-10. 
343. Weinreb, supra note 41, at 259. 
344. Epstein recognizes in passing that "[t]he shift from private lawsuit to government action 
obscures the linkage between rights and correlative duties" but argues that it does not eliminate 
it: "[s]omeone must still take from someone else, even if a third party mediates the transfer." 
Epstein, supra note 186, at 210. The short answer is that government is perpetually taking 
"something," specifically, money, from all of us and redistributing it; this is inherent in the power 
to tax and spend. The question is simply to whom it is distributed. Though Epstein would argue 
for constitutional restrictions on this redistribution, see Epstein, supra note 155, at 94, these 
would simply freeze the status quo, itself a product of government choices about distribution. 
345. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
346. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
347. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CON-
CERNING TOLERATION 62-64 (J. Gough ed. 1946); J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND 
DISCOURSES Bk. I, at 173-78 (G. Cole trans. rev. ed. 1973). 
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is spent. If citizens have a duty to refrain from private violence, there 
ought to be a correlative government duty to protect them. 348 
Ultimately, the nature of government's duties cannot hinge on the 
nature of individual duties. Instead, both hinge on what the Constitu-
tion provides. Individuals are guaranteed certain rights under the 
Constitution. Government has no correlative rights. 349 On the con-
trary, the rights granted by the Constitution are meant to protect indi-
viduals from excessive government power rather than to augment 
governmental power. 35° Furthermore, the duties owed by government 
are often owed collectively, rendering Epstein's idea of an "obvious 
neighbor" irrelevant when governmental obligations, like the duties to 
refrain from unreasonable searches and seizures351 and from denying 
the equal protection of law,352 are in issue.353 As to these duties, no 
particular individual can be identified to reciprocate, nor is there any 
conceivable reciprocal duty, other than those inhering in the vague 
contours of the social contract. 
At bottom, if reciprocity means only that both government and 
citizens possess some duties, it says nothing at all about the scope of 
those duties. This is a question which must be faced on its own terms, 
and which the search for neat pairings of rightholders and duty holders 
can only obscure. 
c. Redistribution and enforcement. There is another, more subtle, 
variation on the argument that affirmative duties would obscure the 
identity of the duty holder. Its premise is that positive rights are often 
stated as "claims made against society in general" which "tend to col-
lapse into amorphous, ideal statements about the way the world 
should be."354 Or, as Professor Robert Cover put it, to speak of a 
right "is not even an intelligible principle unless we know to whom it 
348. See Edelman, supra note 205, at 20-21; Black, supra note 205, at 1106. 
349. See Bandes, supra note 260. Likewise the Lockean theory of natural rights assumes a 
compact in which the government is obligated to the people, not they to it, and therefore "[the] 
government may not properly insist upon any rights accruing to it from the people's compact." 
Doernberg, "We the People'~· John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Chal-
lenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 52, 61 (1985); Bandes, supra note 260, at 1023 n.24. 
350. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 
335, 344 (1963); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968). 
351. See Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 367-72; Doernberg, "The Right of the People'~· Rec-
onciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
259 (1983); Bandes, supra note 260, at 1048 (fourth amendment rights are collectively held). 
352. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 333-34 (certain rights are not individual and alienable, but 
systemic; concerned with structuring power relationships). 
353. Although the Court has often held that the collective nature of rights renders them 
unenforceable by individuals, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), I have argued that such rights should be enforcea-
ble by all who are harmed by their violation. See Bandes, supra note 213, at 284-87. 
354. Chase, Book Review, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 304, 321 (1985) (reviewing T. CAMPBELL, 
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is addressed."355 A related premise is that even if the applicable 
dutyholder is identified, it may claim an inability to discharge the 
duty.356 
These concerns seem particularly relevant to the broad claims for a 
guaranteed subsistence income or satisfying work which are tradition-
ally the province of scholars or jurists warning about the slippery 
slope. When the Court refuses to find an "affirmative" duty in a 
DeShaney situation, involving a particular social service agency's duty 
to a known individual, or a Webster situation, involving the scope of 
an existing federal subsidy program, it is clear enough which govern-
mental agency would shoulder the obligation. If instead we talk about 
the obligation to create a police department or social welfare agency, 
or even to ensure a subsistence income for everyone through unspeci-
fied means, identifying the dutyholder becomes a good deal more diffi-
cult. This particular discussion, however, is not about whether some 
agency somewhere ought to provide these things, but about the scope 
of constitutional protection and whether it ought to include affirmative 
duties. This does not solve the problem, but it does narrow it some-
what. In the constitutional context, a claim for protection or provi-
sion of services is made, not against society in general, but against the 
government. 
Even so, the objection is made that identifying government as the 
dutyholder is problematic: government is too diffuse and affirmative 
duties are too difficult to implement. Several observations can be 
made about this objection. First, it is directed only to implementation 
of duties which appear redistributive, not to those which appear to 
enforce the status quo, although the latter may be equally difficult to 
implement. Second, it is simplistic, because it fails to recognize the 
numerous affirmative duties with which government routinely com-
plies. Finally, it treats the issue of defining constitutional norms as 
contiguous with the issue of enforcing them. 357 If the issue is whether 
the Constitution does, or ought to, impose on the political branches a 
duty to reallocate resources, the manifold problems in enforcing that 
duty must be kept separate. 
The argument might run that the police department has a duty not 
to harm citizens physically; the public schools have a duty not to per-
THE LEFT AND RIGHTS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF SOCIALIST RIGHTS (1983) 
and M. GIBSON, WORKERS' RIGHTS (1983)). 
355. Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order. 5 J.L. & 
RELIGION 65, 71 (1988). 
356. Chase, supra note 354, at 321. 
357. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978). 
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petuate segregation. This duty is merely a command to existing offi-
cials in existing agencies and therefore is easy to implement. However, 
a duty to provide adequate police protection or schooling for the poor 
and minorities would be a request for reallocation of funds, which 
would not be directed to specific agencies or individuals, and therefore 
would be too difficult to implement. 
In this scheme, everything turns on whether government is asked 
to reallocate funds or continue to implement existing programs. The 
question is why this distinction ought to be of constitutional signifi-
cance. The problem seems to be mainly one of enforcement. If a court 
were to determine that government could not discharge its duty to 
protect and provide for its citizens without establishing new police or 
school facilities, it could order that such facilities be built. It would 
then be faced with the undeniably difficult task of obtaining funding 
from the legislature to implement this duty and of obtaining executive 
enforcement of its order. This judicial action would be different (if at 
all) only in degree from the reallocations of government funds which 
courts have been ordering for years. In order to implement the guar-
antees of the eighth amendment, courts have had to order that govern-
ment money be reallocated for expanded and improved prison 
facilities. 358 In order to ensure equal protection of the laws for minori-
ties, courts have had to order substantial expenditures by school dis-
tricts. 359 The Supreme Court this Term reviewed judicial efforts to 
enforce equal protection guarantees by ordering local governments to 
build new public housing and school facilities. At issue were not the 
underlying constitutional norms, but the courts' aggressive methods of 
enforcement. 360 
358. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd., 442 F.2d 304 (8th 
Cir. 1971); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), ajfd. sub nom. Newman v. State 
of Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), revd. in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 
cert. denied sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). 
359. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S 267 (1977). In Milliken the Court upheld an 
order which required state and local government to spend substantial sums of money for educa-
tional programs, including remedial reading, in order to implement a desegregation decree. The 
case illustrates the often fictional nature of the distinction between preservation of the status quo 
and reallocation. Since the state was a defendant, the eleventh amendment bar could be lifted 
only if the relief were prospective in nature, in light of the holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123 (1908), that prospective injunctive relief, unlike retrospective damage relief, see Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), does not impact on the state treasury. The Court characterized the 
order to spend millions of state dollars as "part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring 
about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system." 433 U.S. at 290. That is, the state was 
not ordered to disturb the status quo by reallocating funds it had already committed, but only to 
ensure the availability of future funds. Hence Justice Rehnquist's often quoted understatement 
in Edelman that "the difference between [prospective and retrospective relief] ... will not in 
many instances be that between day and night." 415 U.S. at 667. 
360. In Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990), the Court held that the district court 
had abused its discretion in levying contempt citations, fines and imprisonment against individual 
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It is crucial to separate the issue of identifying constitutional 
norms from the problems of enforcing them. Enforcement of constitu-
tional guarantees often requires judicial oversight of government's al-
locational decisions. As the Court's conception of its role and its 
remedial powers has evolved, it has become more willing to enforce 
norms it once thought unenforceable. 361 That their enforcement 
sometimes requires creativity is not a constitutional objection to the 
underlying norms. The Court continues to express grave reservations 
about upholding relief it deems too intrusive on state and local prerog-
atives. When the Court expresses these reservations by questioning 
the lower courts' exercise of remedial discretion, its logic is difficult to 
attack even if one disagrees with its conclusions. However, when the 
Court blurs the distinction between remedial concerns and the defini-
tion of the underlying norms, its decisions lose force and clarity.362 It 
may be that the Constitution contains some duties to provide basic 
necessities and ensure bodily survival which are not "perfectly en-
forceable in courts of law."363 To deny the existence of these duties 
based on current judicial reluctance or inability to enforce them is to 
risk permanently sacrifichtg their implementation. 364 
IV. THE QUESTION OF VALUES 
I have argued that the conventional wisdom about affirmative 
rights is based on a series of anachronistic assumptions, easy slogans 
and either-or categories which impede understanding of constitutional 
duties. However, the fault with the conventional wisdom is not simply 
its reliance on questionable assumptions and distinctions. The crux of 
the problem is that the conventional wisdom masquerades as neutral 
reason, but in fact reflects extremely restrictive value choices about the 
role of government. Because these choices are masked by rhetoric, 
city council members who refused to comply with a court order to enact legislation required by a 
consent decree to fund public housing. It upheld contempt citations and fines against the city 
itself. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990), the Court struck down on comity grounds 
a district court order imposing an increase on the amount of property taxes levied by a school 
district to fund public school desegregation, but held that federal courts may require the school 
districts themselves to levy taxes in order to fund desegregation. 
361. Compare Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (malapportionment nonjusticiable be· 
cause beyond judicial competence) with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (courts can enforce 
voter franchise through injunctive remedies); see also Bandes, supra note 213, at 304 n.530. 
362. See, for example, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), in which the Court 
denied article III standing based on asserted lack of requisites for injunctive relief. For criticism 
of the decision as blurring the distinction between justiciability and remedial concerns, see Rich· 
ard Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of 
Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 22-35 (1984). 
363. L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 15·9, at 1337. 
364. See Sager, supra note 357, at 1221. 
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they are never fully articulated. It is not the inevitable failure to attain 
neutral reason, but the pretense, that is dangerous. The slogans and 
categories encourage the complacent notion that the restrictive results 
they yield are inevitable. 365 In fact, the results reflect choices which 
must be judged on the merits. 
The conventional approach to defining constitutional duties claims 
to avoid the need to give content to the abstract principles of liberty 
and equality by simply commanding government to do nothing at all. 
Yet through this command it gives content to these principles. Lib-
erty is defined as governmental noninterference, and thus government 
becomes complicit in preserving the current distribution of goods, 
services, and entitlements. Equality is defined as the freedom to com-
pete against others in the marketplace, even for those things the Con-
stitution guarantees. 
To the extent that these principles lead to injustice and inequality, 
the conventional wisdom is that these are the unfortunate but unavoid-
able result of private, individual forces. Yet the distinction between 
public and private limits, or internal and external constraints, is of 
little use in determining whether one's loss of liberty is attributable to 
the government. At best, it is a description of the status quo, and says 
nothing about the way things ought to be. The inability to afford med-
ical care or infant formula or to obtain a basic education is attributable 
to private action or individual limitations only to the extent there is no 
governmental obligation to provide these things. The line between 
public and private spheres of influence is not immutable. 366 This is not 
to suggest that the scope of governmental obligation is without inher-
ent limits. The limits are in the Constitution, but the Constitution 
cannot be interpreted without reference to values. 
For example, in DeShaney and Webster the Court's conclusion 
that the plaintiffs' plight was private and individual - that the gov-
ernment did not act to worsen the position of the injured parties -
assumed a baseline of a complete lack of government services. This 
365. See Minow, supra note 37, at 35: "[T]hese patterns of legal analysis [which focus on 
categorization] imply that legal reasoning yields results of its own accord, beyond human 
control." 
366. The Webster opinion illustrates this point with an ironic twist. It upheld a statute under 
which even private doctors who perform abortions on private patients paying for services with 
private funds will be affected if their admission privileges are at a medical facility which leases or 
rents equipment or land from governmental entities. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.200(2) (1986); 
ACLU/REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT, supra note 176, at 7, 25. Thus it adopts an expan-
sive definition of the public realm, not in order to impose expanded governmental duties, but to 
intrude on formerly private consensual relationships between individuals, private doctors and 
private hospitals. 
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baseline could not be justified as descriptive of the status quo.367 Even 
if it had been, its use would have been a choice to use the status quo as 
a standard.368 Ultimately, the baseline becomes normative: it adopts 
government inaction as the standard against which all its conduct is 
measured; the way things are as the way they should be. 
The choice of baseline cannot be made value-free.369 The unavoid-
able issue is what we ought to expect from government. If the answer 
is nothing at all, that we are lucky not to be living a nasty, brutish, and 
short life, 370 then anything government decides to give will be largess, 
and it can decide to give nothing for any reason at all. If the answer is 
minimal subsistence, or reasonably competent services, the govern-
ment's burden is substantially greater. 
How should the scope of constitutional duty be determined? 
Whether government has an affirmative duty will depend in large part 
on the requisites of the particular constitutional provision at issue. 
Whether or not those requisites will prove determinative, they must at 
least provide the initial focus of the inquiry. 
The trial-related rights, for example, reflect a recognition that un-
less a trial is accompanied by certain affirmative guarantees, such as 
the right to counsel and compulsory process, the core sixth amend-
ment promise of a fair (speedy, public, impartial) trial becomes a nul-
lity. 371 The equal protection clause is concerned with the hazards of 
inequality and discriminatory treatment.372 To avoid both these 
hazards and the imposition of unequal burdens on independently pro-
tected rights, it must sometimes impose an affirmative duty on govern-
ment to provide access, for example to judicial services,373 to public 
fora,374 and to the voting franchise. 375 The due process guarantee of 
procedural regularity holds that in order to guard against the danger 
of arbitrary government action, government is charged with an affirm-
367. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94; 168-75. 
368. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1359-63 (discussing use of history or status quo as a 
baseline). 
369. See Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1450 n.150 (criticizing Kreimer's three suggested base-
lines as importing unstated normative theories). 
370. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1357 (discussing use of Hobbesian state of nature as a 
baseline). 
371. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (counsel); 
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial). 
372. Michelman, supra note 20, at 9. 
373. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
374. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
375. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll 
tax). 
August 1990] Negative Constitution 2345 
ative obligation to provide a hearing before depriving individuals of 
life, liberty, or property.376 
The conventional wisdom stubbornly explains all such examples as 
exceptions which prove the rule,377 but, more accurately, the excep-
tions which riddle the rule of negative rights are evidence of its irrele-
vance. In its insistence on categorizing and then dismissing whole 
categories of government obligation, 378 the rule obscures the correct 
focus of constitutional discourse: the requisites of the Constitution. 
Certain constitutional commands cannot be met without an affirma-
tive effort by the government. 
However, identifying the Constitution as the correct focus of the 
inquiry is not the same as resolving the inquiry. The constitutional 
text is only a starting point. Particularly as to the open-textured pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment; their 
scope cannot be determined without reference to substantive values. 379 
The sixth amendment's comparatively straightforward guarantee 
of the right to counsel, for example, leaves for interpretation the ques-
tion of whether the government must provide such counsel free of 
charge. 380 The Court's winding path to its eventual conclusion in 
favor of appointed counsel evidences the necessity, and the difficulty, 
of giving content to the guarantees of counsel and a fair trial. 
The spare language of the equal protection clause raises issues 
which have proved more intractable. It is necessary to identify the 
objectionable inequalities,381 and how to correct them. If equal pro-
tection were merely a command to treat all persons the same, it would 
lead to a burdening of rights in many instances. In some contexts, 
equal protection involves treating differently placed people differ-
ently. 382 The ideal of equality is "empty" unless it is given substantive 
376. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
377. Currie, supra note 28, at 873-74; supra text accompanying note 27. 
378. See Chase, supra note 354 (distinction between positive and negative rights is used un-
necessarily to subordinate the former to the latter). 
379. See supra text accompanying notes 206-08. 
380. The right to appointed counsel was first recognized in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932), and then only under extremely narrow circumstances. In fact, Powell was a fourteenth 
amendment case premised on fundamental fairness guarantees. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938), found a right to appointed counsel in the sixth amendment in federal cases. It was not 
extended to the states until 1963. 'see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling 
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)). 
381. See Michelman, supra note 20; Kreimer, supra note 9, at 1367. 
382. Minow, supra note 37, at 22-25; Michelman, supra note 20; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 
51, § 16-1, at 1437-38 (discussion of the difference between equal treatment (all persons have 
same access) and treatment as an equal (all persons treated with equal regard, though this means 
taking cognizance of their differences)). One of the most intractable equal protection questions is 
the treatment of poverty. For example, the Griffin-Doug/as principle holds that to some extent 
government has an affirmative obligation to alleviate some of the obstacles posed by poverty. See 
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content. 383 
The due process guarantee has proved similarly opaque. The guar-
antee is directed at the arbitrary use of governmental power. 384 It is 
impossible to give meaning to the guarantee without a notion of the 
proper uses of that power. The Court has avoided the issue by reliance 
on a series of bright lines: only intentional, 385 direct, 386 and coer-
cive387 acts may cause deprivations. Application of these bright lines 
has led to unjust results because they are too coarse to capture the 
complex ways in which government can abuse power.388 The Court 
never explained why the state's disastrous incompetence in DeShaney 
did not offend deeply held notions about governmental obligations to-
ward defenseless children which ought to be imbedded in the Consti-
tution. 389 Likewise it would have been consistent with due process 
notions to hold that the deliberately skewed subsidies in Webster im-
permissibly burdened privacy rights in contravention of Roe v. 
Wade. 390 The Court is discomfited by the amorphous quality of the 
due process clause, and reacts by treating it restrictively. This reaction 
does not succeed in freeing due process jurisprudence of value choices; 
it is a choice in itself. Because it is justified only by reliance on easy 
slogans, it is in danger of appearing as arbitrary as the very action the 
clause condemns. 
Ultimately, the objections to affirmative rights are based on a vi-
sion of the Constitution as a negative document which prevents gov-
ernment and citizens alike from harming one another by force. A 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But later cases 
made clear that this obligation is, as Tribe said, not a guarantee of equal access to criminal 
justice, but of minimal access. L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 16-52, at 1653; see Murray v. Giar-
ratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (state not required to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seek-
ing collateral review); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (same in death penalty 
context); Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (state not required to appoint counsel for indigent 
prisoners seeking discretionary appellate review). The poverty cases illustrate the point that the 
equal protection guarantee is unavoidably interpreted in light of choices about which services 
and commodities must be protected from the workings of the free market. See Radin, supra note 
181, at 1903. 
383. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. 
L. REV. 575 (1983); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
384. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
385. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
386. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006-07 
(1989). 
387. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3052-53 (1989). 
388. See Bandes, supra note 105, at 125-27; see also Burnham, supra note 215, 550-70, (ad-
vancing a definition of the abuse of power prohibited by the due process clause). 
389. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987); Estate of Bailey by 
Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985); Aristotle P. v. Johnson & Morgan, 721 F. 
Supp. 1002, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
390. See Perry, supra note 155; Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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more appealing vision would recognize that just as we are inextricably 
bound to each other, we are dependent on government to preserve our 
liberty by providing certain things we require and expect, and that 
these things must be singled out for constitutional protection. The 
identification of the things we require and expect, as a constitutional 
matter, is crucial. The Court has concerned itself with the elusive and 
ultimately irrelevant distinction between "freedom from and freedom 
to."391 The question that should be asked instead is: what must we 
have in order to be free? 
391. I. BERLIN, supra note 174; J. FEINBERG, supra note 190, at 27. 
